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I. INTRODUCTION
Welfare fraud is an epidemic. Although concentrated in the impover-
ished inner cities of America, this pathetic form of theft has been un-
covered in uptown apartments and beach-front condos. Public assis-
tance fraud can be perpetrated by individuals, families, and "mom-and-
pop" grocery stores. In some cities, it can take on the characteristics of
organized crime. Welfare fraud has even corrupted the public officials
in which the citizenry has vested solemn trust. The numbers are stag-
gering-billions of dollars in government largesse are illegally siphoned
off every year. As one might guess, the public reaction has been one of
absolute anger and distrust. The legislative response has echoed this
public opinion. Unfortunately, the heated rhetoric often fosters draco-
nian solutions, such as placing welfare children in orphanages, cutting
off aid to legal immigrants, or simply abolishing welfare altogether.
Rather than championing efforts to reduce welfare fraud-thereby
diminishing the demand for ignoble and mean-spirited solu-
tions-welfare advocates have invested time and effort into undermin-
ing the investigatory tools available to law enforcement. In this way,
these organizations are slowly but surely "killing the goose that lays the
golden eggs." The final resolution might be to eliminate public assis-
tance programs rather than to countenance unmitigated welfare fraud.
A case in point is the "consent walk-throughs" conducted by public
assistance fraud investigators of the San Diego District Attorney's Of-
fice. With (and only with) the voluntary consent of the welfare recipi-
ents, these investigators inspect residences to insure eligibility for pub-
lic assistance. Various San Diego area welfare advocates, however, have
* Deputy District Attorney, Office of the San Diego District Attorney. J.D., Stan-
ford Law School; B.S., University of Southern California
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balked at this procedure. Although these organizations have not provid-
ed specific illustrations, they have made the general claim that consent
walk-throughs violate the welfare recipients' Fourth Amendment xights.
A comparison of case law to the written policies and actual procedures,
however, reveals that these well-intentioned advocates are mistaken.
The heart of this Article is an analysis of the various investigatory
rubrics that are available to welfare officials. In particular, this piece
will analyze and appraise (1) the welfare "home visit" advocated by the
United States Supreme Court in Wyman v. James,' (2) the consent
search in a welfare context,2 and (3) the suitability of administrative
search warrants to welfare fraud investigations.' With these rubrics in
mind, this author suggests a tiered approach to searches of welfare
recipients' homes. Each of the above-mentioned investigatory tools
would have a discrete but important purpose in preventing and prose-
cuting welfare fraud. In this way, the public's right to prevent fraud and
the recipient's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search-
es and seizures can be harmonized.
II. A PRIMER ON WELFARE FRAUD
A. The Many Faces of Welfare Fraud
On paper, Abdul and Sharifa Roauf appeared to be an unexceptional
example of a family in need. They lacked the means to care for their
children-every dollar the Roaufs could scrap together went to a rela-
tive in need of emergency heart surgery.4 To make ends meet, they re-
ceived public assistance in the form of food stamps, Aid to Families
With Dependent Children (AFDC), and free medical care.' The Roaufs
collected nearly $150,000 in welfare benefits over the course of a de-
cade.' This government largesse was seemingly well spent, ensuring
that the children had a roof over their heads, clothes on their bodies,
and food in their bellies. Public empathy and support appeared to be
warranted.
This family, however, had a few little secrets. Sharifa Roauf was not
an unemployed housewife; she was a fashion designer who created
dresses for contestants in the Miss California and Miss U.S.A. pag-
eants.7 The couple's children were not infants and toddlers; they were
1. 400 U.S. 309 (1971); see infra notes 172-277 and accompanying text.
2. See infra Part llI.B.
3. See iqfra Part UI.C.
4. No Contest Plea in Welfare Fraud Case, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 17, 1996, at A20.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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adults who had long since left home.' There was, in fact, no relative in
dire need of open-heart surgery. The Roaufs also failed to list a few
assets on their welfare application: $144,000 in cash, 17,700 German
Deutschemarks, and "a sizeable amount" of jewelry and U.S. savings
bonds. The apparently destitute couple had duped the government
with impunity. Welfare's version of "Bonnie and Clyde" would only be
brought to justice after an eleven-year fraud spree:
The Roaufs, of course, have their criminal contemporaries. One wel-
fare recipient concealed her employment as a professional art dealer, as
well as her Porsche and Newport Beach apartment." An Oakland cou-
ple received nearly $200,000 in public assistance while living in a luxuri-
ous seven-bedroom residence overlooking the San Francisco Bay. 2
Another member of the welfare rolls lived in a $1500-a-month New York
City apartment and had a "mere" $14,000 in the bank. And Florida
officials uncovered a Palm Beach welfare recipient who owned seven
fried chicken restaurants. 4 Most welfare offenders, however, are sub-
stantially less colorful. A San Diego couple scammed $54,000 in housing
subsidies by feigning their identities: the female played the part of "a
single mother in need of a place to live," while the male thespian "pre-
tended that he was her landlord." 5 An Oxnard, California, woman
fraudulently received more than $30,000 in public assistance based on
the alleged three-year absence of her husband." The father of her five
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Lisa Richardson, Investigators Say They've Seen It All, LA. TIMES (Orange
County edition), Aug. 20, 1995, at A31; Lisa Richardson, O.C. Welfare Recipients Sub-
ject of Random Fraud Investigations, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1995, at Al. Welfare inves-
tigators in Florida have encountered welfare recipients "who drive new Jaguars,
Mercedeses and Mustangs." Barbara Walsh, SWAT Agents Dole Out Blows to S.
Florida's WeVare Cheats, SuN-SENTNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Oct 8, 1995, at Al.
12. Tanya Schevitz, Alleged Welfare Scam Artist Lived in Luxury, S.F. EXAMINER,
Mar. 11, 1995, at A4.
13. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Editorial, Showing the Way on We(fare, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., May 22, 1995, at 72.
14. Walsh, supra note 11, at Al. Similarly, Massachusetts investigators have seen
their share of infamous welfare fraud. "There was the guy on disability who managed
to run marathons, the Andover engineer with the Saab 9000, the Amesbury attorney
with the all-cash practice, the state employee with the yacht: All wormed their way
onto public assistance." Michael Grunwald, Checking the Welfare Rolls; State Investi-
gators Pound Their Beat in Search of Cheaters, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 29, 1995, at 1.
15. Joe Cantlupe, Couple Agree to Repay $54,000 They Got in Illegal Rent Subsi-
dies, SAN DIEGO UNION-TREB., June 21, 1996, at B4.
16. Stephanie Brommer, 3 Face Imprisonment for Welfare Fraud, LA. TIAES, Feb.
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children, however, was far from absent; he had never left the home."7
A single mother living in Ojai, California, received nearly $10,000 in wel-
fare grants to provide for her three sons. Unbeknownst to the county
social services agency, her boys actually lived in Virginia with their fa-
ther.'8 Some Louisiana parents have "coach[ed] their children to act
less intelligent and more troubled than they actually are" to obtain spe-
cial welfare benefits. 9 Legislators and educators have noted that wel-
fare recipients often "prod their children to intentionally underperform
on school tests and misbehave so they can qualify for 'crazy checks.'"2'
Although typically committed by a single individual or family, welfare
fraud can take on an organized, commercial structure. For instance, a
Woodland Hills, California scam artist facilitated dozens of false appli-
cations for public assistance.2 ' The welfare checks were delivered to
the ringleader's home, where the nominal recipients would endorse the
checks and receive a portion of the proceeds.22 In Los Angeles, more
than 200 "Skid Row" homeless people were coerced into signing over
their welfare checks by a band of care home workers.' And from
Maryland 2' to Seattle,2" crooked merchants have unlawfully swapped,
among other things, money, liquor, cigarettes, and narcotics for food
stamps.2
6
6, 1996, at B3.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Bruce Alpert, SSI Has Become a Haven for the Greedy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Mar. 14, 1995, at B7.
20. Id.
21. Jeannette DeSantis, Leader of Welfare Fraud Operation is Convicted, LA.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at B6.
22. Id.; see also Woodland Hills: Leader of Welfare Fraud Ring Sentenced to 6
Years, LA. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1995, at B2; Ed Jahn, Building, Zoning Code Crackdown
Angers Many Residents of Tecate, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., Apr. 30, 1994, at B4 (a San
Diego County investigation uncovered numerous Tecate residents using the same ad-
dress).
23. L.A. Care Facilities are Suspected of Scam, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 1995, at A29.
24. Electronic Food Stamps Prove Vulnerable to Fraud, S.F. CHRON., July 13, 1994,
at A3.
25. Probe Discloses Food-Stamp Abuses, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 2, 1996, at
A6.
26. See also Bogus Stores Key to Food Stamp Fraud, SAN DIEGO UNION-TPaB., Sept.
16, 1994, at A13.
In Los Angeles, the owner of a milk delivery company quit selling dairy prod-
ucts to give his full attention to redeeming food stamps obtained from other
drivers. He charged other drivers a 5 percent handling fee and by the time
he was caught, was illegally redeeming up to $6,000 in food stamps a day.
Id.; see also Stores are Cut from Food Stamp Program, LA. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1995, at
A21.
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Welfare fraud can also smack of ignominy and absurdity. The media
have uncovered convicted criminals illegally collecting welfare benefits
while incarcerated. According to one Social Security official, "As many
as 10 percent of California's 74,000 county jail inmates may be defraud-
ing $36 million to $60 million" in public assistance.27 Conversely, wel-
fare fraud sometimes infiltrates the ranks of public trust. For example,
a San Diego police officer and his spouse allegedly defrauded $30,000 in
state relief.' "The couple pretended not to be married," argued prose-
cutors, "so the wife could pose as a single mother of three and collect
welfare benefits."'9 A San Bernardino County welfare worker arranged
for $59,000 in illegal public assistance payments to four cohorts.30 And
a number of employees of the San Francisco Department of Social Ser-
vices orchestrated welfare payments to fictitious recipients.3 The so-
cial workers surreptitiously put friends and relatives on welfare rolls
and then took a "fun-in-the-sun Caribbean cruise" on the government's
bill to boot.'
These are the many faces of welfare fraud. They are sometimes arro-
gant, other times pitiful, but always criminal.
B. The Categories of Welfare Fraud
The typical perpetrator of public assistance fraud fits within one of
three categories. First, a recipient may hide earnings from employ-
ment.' "Unreported income" constitutes the leading form of welfare
27. Inmates Collecting from Uncle Sam, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 12, 1995, at
A3. California is not the only state duped by prison inmates. Connecticut's attorney
general, for example, has estimated that more than $2 million in state welfare bene-
fits have been illegally received by incarcerated criminals. Christopher Keating, State
Says Nine Inmates Received Wetfare Checks Behind Bars, HARmRoD CouRANT, Dec.
16, 1995, at A3.
28. Kelly Thornton, Policing the Police, SAN DIEGO UNION-TREB., June 17, 1996, at
Al.
29. Id.
30. 3 Strikes Means 200 Years for Welfare Fraud, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 6,
1995, at A3.
31. Clarence Johnson & Thaai Walker, DA's Office Raids Social Services Depart-
ment, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 24, 1995, at A17; Jim Herron Zamora, Alleged Welfare Scam
Detailed; 3 in S.F. Office Allegedly Procured Benefits for Relations, a Jailed Boy-
friend, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 2, 1995, at A4.
32. Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, S.F. Wetfare Workers Took Clients on Cruise
DA Says, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 8, 1995, at A17.
33. Eloise Anderson, State Welfare System is an Easy Mark, SAN DIEGO UNION-
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fraud." Second, a parent who has been certified as "absent" in order
to collect augmented payments may, in fact, be present in the home.'
Third, the recipient may fraudulently collect government child support
when his children actually live elsewhere.'
Another significant form of welfare fraud is committed by individuals
who are geographically ineligible. For example, an extensive multi-state
investigation uncovered seventy-seven people who worked in Nevada
but illegally received public assistance benefits in Arizona, 7 A New
York state probe revealed that a quarter of its recipients were also
members of New Jersey's welfare rolls.' The most infamous and pub-
licly decried version of welfare "forum shopping," however, has an
international flavor. Non-citizens-almost exclusively Mexican nation-
als--cross the border to receive welfare benefits au gratis before repa-
triating.' California Assemblymember Jan Goldsmith videotaped nu-
merous Mexican citizens "day-tripping into the United States for free
medical care."4" The state legislator found that the international de-
frauders were "so brazen and unafraid of being caught that many
park[ed] at U.S. clinics in their cars with Mexican plates."" On any
particular day, a single welfare investigator can catch upwards of twen-
ty Mexican residents illegally collecting welfare benefits.42 And lest one
believes that only impoverished non-citizens commit international wel-
fare fraud, investigations have uncovered affluent foreigners entering
the United States for expensive surgeries on the taxpayers' bill.'
Organized welfare racketeering primarily revolves around the illegal
trade and trafficking of food stamps. The basic scam involves welfare
recipients selling their food stamps at less than face value-typically
fifty to seventy cents on the dollar-in exchange for hard cash." Then
TRm., May 13, 1994, at B7; Jonathan Marshall, Big Increase in Fraud in Child Wel-
fare Cases, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 2, 1993, at C5; Scott Steepleton, Countywide Investiga-
tors Arrest 22 Wetfare Recipients, LA. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1997, at B3.
34. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 33, at C5.
35. Anderson, supra note 33, at B7; Marshall, supra note 33, at C5.
36. Steepleton, supra note 33, at B3.
37. Casino Workers Gambled and Lost, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Oct. 6, 1996, at A3.
38. Zuckerman, supra note 13, at 72.
39. See Rex Dalton, State Adds Inspectors. at Border to Foil Medi-Cal, We~fare
Fraud, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRW., Mar. 16, 1994, at BI; Leonel Sanchez, State Investiga-
tors Launch 3-Day Medi-Cal Fraud Sweep, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 19, 1997, at
A3; Debra J. Saunders, Editorial, In Video Veritas, S.F. CHRON., May 26, 1996, at 9Zl;
Editorial, Hands Across the Border, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 3, 1995, at B6.
40. Saunders, supra note 39, at 9Z1.
41. Id.
42. Dalton, supra note 39, at B1.
43. Sanchez, supra note 39, at A3.
44. See Jennifer Dixon, USDA Mulls Slashing Number of Stores that Take Food
1240
[Vol. 24: 1235, 1997] Welfare Fraud
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the retailer (usually a corrupt grocer) redeems the full value of the food
stamps via the government. 45 The recipients might also trade their food
stamps for statutorily prohibited items, such as alcohol and ciga-
rettes.' Federal investigators have uncovered sham grocery stores
without food inventory that exclusively launder trafficked food
stamps. 47 According to an assistant inspector general for the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA), "Food stamps are so lucra-
tive for some people that they forget about the grocery business and
get into the food stamp business."' A whole variety of intermediaries
can be injected into a food stamp scam.49 Most notably, recipients can
exchange their food stamps for narcotics, and drug dealers then sell the
coupons to retailers for cash.'
Stamps, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 6, 1995, at A10 [hereinafter Dixon, USDA Mulls
Slashing] ("In a typical trafficking scheme, food stamp recipients sell their coupons
for cash to a retailer who pays them less than face value, generally 50 to 70 cents
on the dollar. The grocer is then reimbursed the full amount from [the federal gov-
ernment]."); see also Jennifer Dixon, Food Stamp Scams Glet Elaborate, S.F. CHRoN.,
Mar. 31, 1994, at B2 [hereinafter Dixon, Food Stamp Scams] ("[N]etworks of small
grocery stores are buying food stamps from recipients at cut rates, then redeeming
them from the government at full value."); Bogus Stores Key to Food Stamp Fraud,
supra note 26, at A13; Electronic Food Stamps Prove Vulnerable to Fraud, supra
note 24, at A3; Stores are Cut From Food Stamp Program, supra note 26, at A21.
45. Dixon, USDA Mulls Slashing, supra note 44, at A10.
46. Probe Discloses Food-Stamp Abuses, supra note 25, at A6.
47. Bogus Stores Key to Food Stamp PFraud, supra note 26, at A13.
48. Id.
49. See Lorenza Munoz, 18 Held in Food Stamp Inquiry, LA. TEMS., Feb. 7, 1996,
at B2 ('The two-month investigation... zeroed in on so-called 'runners,' who buy
food stamps at 5096 of their value from recipients and then resell the stamps to gro-
cery stores authorized by the USDA to redeem the stamps."); Bogus Stores Key to
Food Stamp Fraud, supra note 26, at A13 ("Some recipients use their coupons to
buy drugs, alcohol or other contraband, investigators say, while restaurants trade
them for produce and meat with their suppliers and route drivers."); Stores are Cut
from Food Stamp Program, supra note 26, at A21 ("Unscrupulous grocers may also
purchase food stamps from other stores, wholesalers, route drivers or drug dealers,
who exchange cash and contraband for coupons.").
50. See John L Mitchell, 683 Stores Barred From U.S. Food Stamp Program, LA.
TMEs, Nov. 17, 1995, at B3 ("Food stamps also have become a medium of exchange
for cash to buy drugs.. . ."); Dixon, USDA Mulls Slashing, supra note 44, at A10
("Crooked retailers also may buy stamps from drug dealers and other traffickers who
trade the coupons for cash and contraband."); Dixon, Food Stamp Scams, supra note
44, at B2 ("[The retailers'] source of food stamps may be welfare recipients or mid-
dlemen and drug dealers, who trade the paper coupons for drugs or other items of
value on the street.").
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C. Welfare Fraud by the Numbers
The sheer magnitude of American public assistance is overwhelming.
Nationwide, 27.5 million people received food stamps in 1994-or one
out of every ten Americans 5 -with a government price tag of about
$25 billion.52 In 1991, the federal government topped the $20 billion
mark in AFDC payments.' Unfortunately, public assistance fraud has
kept pace with the ever-increasing federal welfare budget.'4 The USDA
estimated that $3 billion in food stamps are fraudulently acquired every
year.' Some officials have estimated that the fraud rate for food
stamps hovers around ten percent.' Others have argued that the per-
centage is much larger, particularly in non-food stamp aid. According to
a survey of welfare officials, "The most common [AFDC fraud] esti-
mates centered around 30 percent.""
Welfare fraud is at epidemic proportions in some states and local
communities. New York City found that sixty percent of its public assis-
tance applicants were actually ineligible.' Florida officials estimate
that nearly fifty-one percent of state welfare cases are fraudulent.' 9 In
California, nearly three million people receive AFDC assistance,' and
51. Bogus Stores Key to Food Stamp Fraud, supra note 26, at A13.
52. Dixon, USDA Mulls Slashing, supra note 44, at A10 (program costs $24 billion
a year); Robert Pear, Bid to Abolish Food Stamps Fails in House, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRm., Feb. 25, 1995, at Al (program costs $25 billion a year); Tom Webb, Some in
GOP Resist Shift of Food Stamps, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-THi., Feb. 24, 1995, at A13 (pro-
gram costs $26 billion a year).
53. See Survey Finds Welfare Fraud, Errors Cost $1 Billion, S.F. CiRoN., Apr. 12,
1994, at A5 (stating the government paid $20.7 billion to "low income families in
1991").
54. It should be noted that the United States is not the only nation afflicted by
welfare fraud. Canadian officials have uncovered prison inmates illegally collecting
millions of dollars in public assistance payments. Scott Magnish & Dick Chapman,
Metrocrats Nailed Cons on Welfare, TORONTO SUN, Mar. 21, 1997, at 3; Ian Robertson,
Cons in Wefare Scam, TORONTO SUN, Mar. 20, 1997, at 2. Additionally, $4.5 billion in
welfare fraud is committed each year in Great Britain. See Sarah Lyall, Britain Seeks
Informers to Fight Welfare Fraud, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1996, at A1O.
55. See Munoz, supra note 49, at B2; Wefare Reform... Demagogues Have a
Field Day with Overhaul, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRI., Mar. 9, 1995, at B10.
56. Food Stamp Fraud Costs U.S. $1.8 Bilion, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-Tm., July 18,
1994, at A6.
57. Anderson, supra note 33, at B7.
58. See Zuckerman, supra note 13, at 72; Malcolm Forbes, Jr., Magnificent Mayor,
FORBES, Sept 11, 1995, at 23. For example, nearly 30,000 New York City residents
falsely claim that they are renting rooms in other people's apartments in order to re-
ceive housing subsidies. Russ Buettner, New Lease on WeVare Scams Seen, DAILY
NEWS (New York), Mar. 21, 1996, at 8.
59. Walsh, supra note 11, at Al. Moreover, as much as 5996 of Florida food stamp
claims are fraudulent. Id.
60. Anderson, supra note 33, at B7.
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the state distributes almost $3 billion in food stamps.1 In fact, Califor-
nia doles out $28,000 in welfare benefits every minute. 2 Cautious esti-
mates, however, place the total amount of welfare fraud in California at
$1 billion per year.' Some experts have argued that as many as sixty-
two percent of all state public assistance recipients are committing
some form of welfare fraud.' The amount of AFDC fraud alone is
"enough money to pay for 750 million meals at a nonprofit food kitchen
or to buy 50,000 new police cars. " '
A number of California communities have felt the brunt of public
assistance theft. In Los Angeles County, one million residents receive
$70 million in food stamps each month,' while 900,000 people collect
$160 million in AFDC benefits per month. 7 Overall, one in five county
residents receives some type of welfare payment.'M A recent study,
however, determined that more than thirty-five percent of these welfare
recipients were defrauding the system.' A similar investigation in Fres-
no County concluded that nearly forty-three percent of all welfare bene-
fits resulted from fraud.7° In Orange County, approximately $9 million
in food stamps are disbursed each month to about 142,000 recipients,7
but a staggering 62.5% of child-only welfare payments in Orange County
61. Munoz, supra note 49, at B2.
62. Anderson, supra note 33, at B7.
63. Probing of Welfare Recipients Under Fire: Foes Liken Investigation to State-
Sponsored Spying, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRi., Aug. 21, 1995, at A3 [hereinafter Probing
of Welfare Recipients Under Fire]. For example, this includes $100 million of defraud-
ed medical benefits per year. See Sanchez, supra note 39, at A3.
64. See Debra J. Saunders, Rampant Fraud in AFDC, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 3, 1993, at
A28; see also Richardson, O.C. Welfare Recipients Subject of Random Fraud Investi-
gations, supra note 11, at Al. The numbers for individual welfare programs can be
staggering. Of the cases investigated, nearly 67% of Medi-Cal's free medical services
recipients were committing fraud. Bonnie Weston, Healthy Take From Medi-Ca
Sweep, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 27, 1996, at B1.
65. Richardson, O.C. Welfare Recipients Subject of Random .Fraud Investigations,
supra note 11, at Al.
66. Mitchell, supra note 50, at B3.
67. See Leslie Berger, Savings Seen in Welfare Fingerprint Program, LA. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 1994, at B1.
68. See id.
69. CAuFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, LOS ANGELES COUNTY WELFARE
FRAUD STUDY (1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Los ANGELES COUNTY WELFARE
FRAUD STUDY].
70. Id.
71. Lisa Richardson, Feeding Their Fear Food Stamp Changes Leave Some Recipi-
ents Expecting the Worst, LA. TiMEs, Oct. 2, 1996, at B1.
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are fraudulent.' A follow-up study determined that forty-five percent
of all Orange County welfare recipients were committing fraud." Even
with the limited resources available for welfare investigations, Orange
County law enforcement was able to detect and prevent nearly $300
million in public assistance fraud over a four-year period.7' In San Die-
go County, $500 million in AFDC benefits are distributed to 63,000 re-
cipients each year, with another 150,000 county residents receiving
other forms of public assistance.' From July 1996 through January
1997, however, county investigators uncovered more than $4 million in
actual and potential welfare fraud.'6
These are the statistics for welfare fraud-they speak for themselves.
D. Rhetoric and Reaction to Welfare Fraud
Welfare has been placed in the crucible of public scrutiny.' Former
President Ronald Reagan's image of the "welfare queen" continues to
haunt American discourse.' A majority of those polled in a Los Angel-
es Times survey believed that "[pleople are poor because they don't
want to work, because welfare pays better, because they lack morals
and values, or have been through a divorce or other family break-
down." ' The survey's lead sociologist concluded that "[p]eople here
believe the poor in large part have brought their problems on them-
selves."' "There is an antipathy to the welfare system here and anger
72. Los ANGELES COUNTY WELFARE FRAUD STUDY, supra note 69.
73. Study Shows Orange County Praud at 45%, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 2,
1997, at A3 (referring to a study that randomly selected 450 recipients in Orange
County).
74. Richardson, O.C. Welfare Recipients Subject of Random Fraud Investigations,
supra note 11, at Al.
75. Ruth L McKinnie, Welfare Would Get a New Look in County; Supervisors, if
They Made Policy, Would Set Time Limit, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRiB., Feb. 27, 1995, at
B1; Caitlin Rother, County Battles Fraud in Welfare: Supervisors Turn to High-Tech
Devices, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Jan. 25, 1996, at B1.
76. SAN DIEGO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, WELFARE INVESTIGATIONS
SUMMARY, FRscAL YEAR 1996-1997 (on file with author).
77. "Ask your friends about it. Ask your family. Ask strangers on the street," ar-
gues one social worker. "Virtually every discussion about welfare reform centers on
'putting those damn freeloaders to work. '" Bill Polick, Opinion, Welfare is a Mess; but
None is Worse, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., Dec. 27, 1995, at B9.
78. See, e.g., David Whitman & Paul Glastris, Let 50 Flowers Bloom, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 27, 1995, at 24 ("During the 1976 presidential primaries, Ronald
Reagan started using his famous anecdote about a 'welfare queen' in Chicago who
used multiple aliases to collect thousands of dollars in welfare.").
79. Rebecca Trounson, Times Orange County Poll, LA. T)3S, Nov. 15, 1995, at
Al.
80. Id.
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at having to support it," opined another scientist involved in the poll.8
Fifty-three percent of those surveyed believed that poor people have it
easy because they receive welfare benefits without doing anything in re-
turn.' Likewise, a majority felt that "[t]he government should [not]
guarantee every citizen enough to eat and a place to sleep."' More
than two-thirds of those surveyed believed that welfare entices able-
bodied people to become dependent on government aid.' "There are
lots of jobs out there right now for anyone who wants to work," argued
one participant in the study.' "But so many of these people don't want
to 'lower themselves.' It's easier to just mooch off the system." '
The current public resentment of welfare recipients is not a novel
phenomenon; its pedigree can be traced to the fabled American work
ethic. "There is a centuries-old notion that being poor is an indicator of
immorality," argues UCLA law professor Gary Blasi.87 "There is a pre-
sumption that all moral people are hard-working people, and hard-work-
ing people have jobs."8' When this presumption inexplicably fails, the
public points the finger at two much-maligned groups. First, the public
often views welfare recipients as alcoholics and drug addicts who ex-
ploit the system to get their "fix."' Cutting back on welfare, some
have argued, will "protect taxpayers from subsidizing drug and alcohol
abusers."' Second, the public unartfully associates welfare with race
and national origin. In the aforementioned Los Angeles Times poll, mi-
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (52% disagreeing with the original statement).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Richardson, O.C. Welfare Recipients Subject of Random Praud Investigations,
supra note 11, at A31.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Trounson, supra note 79, at A31. "Why do we give general relief and
other welfare checks to homeless alcoholics and drug addicts who then spend the
money on their drug of choice?" Funding of Drug Addicts, Opinion, SAN DIEGO UN-
ioN-TRIB., May 15, 1994, at G2. Some politicians argue that welfare recipients are
being unfairly stereotyped "as drug users, when in fact they are most often youthful
women with children." Elliot Diringer & John Wildermuth, Welfare Plan Attacked as
Unrealistic, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 9, 1997, at Al. Others, however, point to one welfare
recipient's public statements as being indicative of reality: "The price of [marijuana]
has really gone up recently.... I'm on welfare and I can't afford it now." Id.
90. Caitlin Rother, County Slashes General Relief, SAN DIEGO UNoN-TRm., Apr. 26,
1995, at Al.
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norities and immigrants were the groups most often identified with
poverty and welfare.9 Scapegoating racial minorities and recent immi-
grants, either by overt attacks or veiled rhetoric, has become an unfor-
tunate mantra of many welfare opponents.u
As expected, government officials have responded to this public opin-
ion with their own phalanx against the welfare system. The governor of
California recently assailed welfare as a form of "subsidized idle-
ness."' San Diego county supervisors "clearly disdain" the welfare pro-
grams they control, arguing that "[wielfare fosters dependence on gov-
ernment in place of individual responsibility."' These local officials
assert that "the welfare system makes a mockery of the work ethic
when it should preach it. It's anti-family and perpetuates the
multigenerational cycle of poverty."95 The California Health and Wel-
fare Secretary has been equally critical of the state's public assistance
programs: "We cannot and will not tolerate this outrageous abuse of a
system that is intended to help the truly needy and not the truly
greedy."'6
"[N]othing can hurt the current [welfare] system," argued Wisconsin
Governor Tommy Thompson-"It's broken."97 Both congressional lead-
ers and state legislators have promulgated this "nothing to lose" philos-
ophy. Some of the suggested reforms seem eminently reasonable,98
while other methods appear overly intrusive or even draconian. Some
lawmakers advocate tying benefits to the academic grades achieved by
the children of welfare recipients.' Others would prevent recipients
91. Trounson, supra note 79, at A31.
92. See, e.g., Marcus Stem, Wilson Scolded on Prop. 187, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Nov. 22, 1994, at Al.
93. Diringer & Wildermuth, supra note 89, at Al.
94. McKinnie, supra note 75, at B1.
95. Id.
96. Lisa Richardson, State Welfare Official Touts Wilson Policy, LA. TIMES, Aug.
29, 1995, at B4.
97. Whitman & Glastris, supra note 78, at 26.
98. High-tech welfare reforms have been installed throughout the nation, including
electronic food stamp "swipe" cards that operate like automated teller machine (ATM)
cards; fingerprint and photo imaging of welfare recipients to prevent fraud; and direct
deposit of welfare payments into recipients' bank accounts to preclude illegal traffick-
ing in welfare checks. Rother, supra note 75, at B1; AFDC Fingerprinting Will Begin
in L.A., SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 31, 1994, at A3. Other programs target those
who are caught defrauding the system, including posting the names of people convict-
ed of welfare fraud and permanently disqualifying the offenders from ever collecting
benefits again. County Will Post Welfare Fraud Names, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May
13, 1994, at B2; Edward Epstein, Wilson Begins New Attack on Welfare Fraud, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 19, 1994, at B3.
99. Diringer & Wildermuth, supra note 89, at Al (attendance); McKinnie, supra
note 75, at B1 (grades).
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from collecting higher payments for additional children and would fur-
nish birth control for all beneficiaries."w A number of states, including
California, have contemplated requiring underage mothers to live with
their parents in order to be eligible for welfare benefits."°' Further-
more, both federal and state legislators have advocated placing welfare
children in state-run orphanages under certain circumstances. 2
California's governor has even urged county welfare offices to advise
poor mothers in risky living environments to give up their children for
adoption." Many officials, however, are not interested in changing
the system-they want to downsize or even abolish government-spon-
sored welfare."° "Popular political thinking," argues one welfare offi-
cial, "calls for the elimination of social-welfare altogether. " "
One would think that welfare advocates and civil libertarian organiza-
tions would focus their efforts on assuaging negative public opinion,
advocating the substantial benefits of public assistance, and saving the
welfare "safety net." Eliminating welfare programs would undoubtedly
exacerbate crime rates, increase the homeless population, and create
serious public health risks." "Without the food stamps," related one
seventy-five-year-old widow, "all I will have left to do is die. Without
them,... I will starve to death."0 7 Six-year-old Alison Higginbotham
suffers from a "rare seizure disorder called infantile spasms."'" With
welfare support, Alison has a chance at a full, normal life; without pub-
100. One Small Step, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., Dec. 14, 1995, at B14; McKinnie, supra
note 75, at B1; Carolyn Lochhead, Welfare Overhaul Stymied in D.C., Critics Com-
plain, S.F. CHaoN., May 28, 1996, at A3.
101. A New Poor Law, THE ECONObUST, Oct. 28, 1995, at 28; Lochhead, supra note
100, at A3; One Small Step, supra note 100, at B14. In 1995, Massachusetts consid-
ered prohibiting the payment of welfare benefits to unwed teen mothers. Connie
Paige, Weld: Fingerprint Wetfare Recipients, BOSTON HERAu, Oct. 18, 1995, at 1.
Some argued, however, that such a ban would have driven teenage mothers into
prostitution. Id.
102. McKinnie, supra note 75, at BI.
103. Virginia Ellis & Dave Lesher, Wilson Details We~fare Changes to Save $550
Million, LA. TmEs, Jan. 10, 1997, at Al.
104. See, e.g., id.; Epstein, supra note 98, at B3; Lochhead, supra note 100, at A3;
One Small Step, supra note 100, at Bi; Pear, supra note 52, at Al; Polick, supra
note 77, at B9; Rother, supra note 75, at Bi.
105. Polick, supra note 77, at B9.
106. See id.
107. Richardson, supra note 71, at B1.
108. Alpert, supra note 19, at B7.
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lic assistance, she would have to be institutionalized. " Forty-five-
year-old Constance Cortes has been wheelchair-bound since suffering a
stroke seven years ago."' Although she has repeatedly tried to get a
job, employers routinely reject her because of her physical disabili-
ty."' Instead of being a homeless vagrant, public assistance allows
Cortes to help "distribute food bags to people worse off than herself
and write [] letters for neighbors who can't read or write.""' These
are the images that welfare advocates should be extolling-people in
need through no fault of their own.
Unfortunately, the ostensible defenders of the poor have focused an
inordinate amount of their resources in an i-fated battle. Instead of
attacking legislative attempts to limit or eliminate public assistance,
welfare advocates have vehemently criticized law enforcement efforts
to uncover fraud. For example, after the culmination of a comprehen-
sive welfare investigation in Orange County, the local Legal Aid Society
assailed both the motives and methods of law enforcement."3 "There's
nothing I've seen in state law that authorizes this kind of far-reaching
investigation of welfare recipients," argued a senior attorney with the
Legal Aid Society."" "And even if there were, it would violate federal
constitutional principles.""' A Los Angeles welfare advocate vilified
the law enforcement priorities: "If they spent just an iota- of the time
looking at white-collar crime, they would bring in a whole lot more
money than they would bring in going after welfare fraud.""' And an-
other welfare supporter questioned the benefits of investigating fraud,
arguing that "[elven if someone was later determined ineligible, I won-
der how much it would cost."" 7
109. Id.
110. Trounson, supra note 79, at Al.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Probing of Welfare Recipients Under Fire, supra note 63, at A3; Richardson,
State Welfare Official Touts Wilson Policy, supra note 96, at B4; Richardson, O.C.
Welfare Recipients Subject of Random Fraud Investigations, supra note 11, at Al.
Similarly, welfare advocates in northern California fiercely criticized "heavy handed"
consent searches conducted by Vallejo law enforcement during early morning hours.
Suzanne Espinosa Soils, ACLU Says Raid May Have Violated Privacy Rights, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 15, 1997, at A15.
114. Probing of Wefare Recipients Under Fire, supra note 63, at A3; Richardson,
O.C. Wefare Recipients Subject of Random Fraud Investigations, supra note 11, at
Al.
115. Richardson, State Wefare Official Touts Wilson Policy, supra note 96, at B4;
see also Probing of Welfare Recipients Under Fire, supra note 63, at A3; Richardson,
O.C. Wefare Recipients Subject of Random Fraud Investigations, supra note 11, at
Al.
116. AFDC Fingerprinting Will Begin in L.A., supra note 98, at A3.
117. Saunders, supra note 39, at 9Z1.
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Assuming that these arguments have some validity, welfare advocates
still miss the bigger issues. "Instead of blasting proposals to address
welfare fraud as scapegoating the poor," argued the director of the Cali-
fornia Department of Social Services, "critics should be embracing ef-
forts to eliminate it.""" First, welfare fraud takes money away from
those who truly need assistance."' Those who defraud the system, ar-
gues a former welfare recipient, are "not stealing from the rich taxpay-
er, they're stealing from the person in line behind them who legitimate-
ly needs the help. They're stealing from a child.""0 Second, and more
importantly, it makes more sense to prevent, investigate, and prosecute
welfare fraud rather than squeezing the blamless with sweeping budget
cuts. 12' An attorney for the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles sar-
castically attacked efforts to uncover welfare fraud with the following
rhetorical question: "If you want to save a whole lot more [money],
then why not shut down the whole program?""2 However uninten-
tionally made, this advocate uncovered the precise point that many
welfare supporters have missed. If government is not allowed to pre-
vent fraud effectively, welfare programs are likely to be eliminated. "I
think the American people genuinely feel the need to support peoplein
poverty who legitimately have a financial need," opined the executive
director of the American Public Welfare Association."2 "[A]t the same
time, they appropriately resent any situations in which their generosity
118. Anderson, supra note 33, at B7.
119. See Mitchell, supra note 50, at B3 ("Those profiting from food stamps are
literally stealing food out of the mouths of children and needy families."); Probing of
Welfare Recipients Under Fire, supra note 63, at A3 ("There are really people who
need help, but unfortunately the cheaters are taldng so much out of available dollars
that people who really need help don't have as much."); Richardson, supra 96, at B4
("We cannot and will not tolerate this outrageous abuse of a system that is intended
to help the truly needy and not the truly greedy."); Saunders, supra note 64, at A28
("Welfare advocates ought to support this fraud eradication program in that it spells
more money for the truly needy, but few do."); Steepleton, supra note 33, at B3
(noting that welfare "is a system based on a relationship of trust between the county
and needy families and individuals. Because the system was designed to aid families
and individuals in need, the people who cheat the system affect those most in need
and increase the burden on the taxpayers.").
120. Mary Curran-Downey, Faces of Welfare, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 19, 1995,
at B3.
121. Berger, supra note 67, at BI.
122. Id.
123. Richardson, O.C. Welfare Recipients Subject of Random Fraud Investigations,
supra note 11, at Al.
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is being taken advantage of."'24 By assailing efforts to prevent fraud,
welfare advocates are slowly but surely killing the goose that lays the
golden eggs--or, if you prefer, cutting off their noses in spite of their
faces.
Some of the most ardent supporters of increased efforts to crack
down on fraud are welfare recipients themselves.12 For example,
ninety-five percent of all aid recipients favored a fingerprinting program
to prevent multiple case fraud.12 According to the director of research
and statistics for the Los Angeles Department of Public Social Services,
"[R]ecipients feel this will make the [welfare] program more credi-
ble.""'27 "I think it's a good idea," said one welfare recipient-"There's
a lot of fraud out there. It's a good idea to buckle down on them."28
Another public assistance beneficiary argued, "If we can cut out the
fraud, maybe those of us who really need the help will get it."" These
are the words of those in need, not the sound bites of their gilded advo-
cates. Welfare recipients understand that the elimination of fraud is
merely a proxy for a bigger issue--the continuing viability of the wel-
fare system itself.
E. The San Diego Consent Walk-Through
Like most counties in California, San Diego employs "consent walk-
throughs" to verify eligibility for welfare benefits and to uncover sus-
pected fraud. The purpose of this consent-based investigation is to
corroborate pertinent application information provided by welfare re-
cipients. The walk-through includes looking for evidence to prove that
an ostensibly "absent parent" is out of the residence, that a dependent
child is present in the home, that recipients are not receiving unreport-
ed income, and that the beneficiary does, in fact, live at the alleged
residence."°
One might be inclined to question the usefulness of this investigatory
procedure and ask: "What can be discovered by walking through
124. Id.
125. See Karen Kucher, Probers Weed Ourt Welfare Cheaters, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
July 7, 1997, at BI ("I think it is a really good idea [to conduct home searches].
How else can you make sure that the facts are all there? It doesn't bother me at
all."); Trounson, supra note 79, at Al ("Cortes said she understands the anger of peo-
ple who believe the government needs to do a better job of policing welfare fraud,
and she favors several of the new restrictions on eligibility."); Paige, supra note 101,
at 1.
126. See Berger, supra note 67, at Bi.
127. Id.
128. Matt Lait, We~are Cheats Targeted, LA. TIMES, Sept. 22,'1994, at Bi.
129. Id.
130. See Kucher, supra note 125, at B1.
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someone's residence?" The answer is plenty. As described by two Los
Angeles investigators, "[S]urprise visits to recipients' homes have turned
up fathers, who were reported by the mothers to be absent deadbeats,
.hiding in the closet."13' These investigators "have unraveled employ-
ment and Social Security paper trails to find hundreds of dollars in in-
come more than recipients have declared on their welfare applica-
tions. " " The director of the California Department of Social Services
noted that social workers who process the welfare applications "seldom
see the children who are being aided."' 33
Applicants may receive aid for children who do not live with them or do not exist
by using phony birth certificates, and county welfare officials have almost no way
of knowing it. What's more, welfare recipients are not required to provide any
proof of residence in the county where they apply for aid. Applicants can supply
post office boxes as addresses and receive their welfare checks with no questions
asked. And [when] no home visits are conducted, they have little fear of ever
being caught.134
A Los Angeles welfare study, "emphasiz[ing] the impact that unan-
nounced home/field calls have on the prevention and detection of wel-
fare fraud," concluded that most information confirming or contradicting
eligibility is obtained by walk-throughs."3 Moreover, consent walk-
throughs often uncover children living in dangerous or unsupervised
conditions. Investigators have found youngsters with nothing to eat. "I
went to one home where the woman basically had a pile of bones in
some water and was making soup," related one investigator. 3" Others
have found young children left alone for hours on end: "There are people
who just don't realize that a 9-year-old shouldn't be watching the 4-year-
old.
"137
San Diego County has two categories of welfare fraud inquiries. "Early
fraud" investigators check suspicious applications prior to any public
assistance payments." The goal of this type of probe is not criminal
prosecution but to confirm eligibility and to prevent theft before a crimi-
nal case would otherwise be necessary. "Full field" investigators, on the
131. Richardson, Investigators Say They've Seen It Alt, supra note 11, at A31.
132. Id.
133. Anderson, supra note 33, at B7.
134. Id.
135. Los ANGELES COUNTY WELFARE FRAUD STUDY, supra note 69, at iv.
136. Richardson, Investigators Say They've Seen It All, supra note 11, at A31.
137. Id.
138. Anderson, supra note 33, at B7 (noting that in an "early fraud" investigation,
"suspicious applications can be double-checked before any money is disbursed").
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other hand, uncover fraud after welfare payments have been made.'
Although criminal prosecution is not necessarily the aim of full field
investigations, it remains a distinct possibility in every inquiry. Both early
fraud and full field investigators rely on consent walk-throughs of
recipients' homes as the primary investigatory tool in performing their
duties.
The written policies regarding consent walk-throughs are clear and
concise. Investigators are not to enter a recipient's residence without
permission and should tell the recipient that the encounter is consen-
sual.14 The consent to enter must be freely and voluntarily given and
must not result from the recipient's submission to an unlawful assertion
of authority, intimidation, or coercion.1 4 ' Because the walk-throughs are
based on consent, investigators must respect and abide by a recipient's
request to terminate the inquiry. Investigators should identify themselves
and state their reasons for the visit." Moreover, the policies emphasize
that investigators' attitudes should be professional, courteous, and re-
spectful toward the recipients." The recipient, rather than the investi-
gator, takes the lead in the search. They open doors, go through rooms,
pull out drawers, and move items for inspection; the investigator merely
follows the recipient. A child may not authorize a walk-through, and nei-
ther a roommate nor a landlord may consent to a search of the
recipient's rented living areas.144 Investigators may not enter rooms to
which the recipient does not have access, nor rooms where permission
to enter has not been given. The policies also remind investigators that
illegally obtained information or evidence will be inadmissible in
court. 14
5
The practice of the San Diego public assistance fraud investigators
strictly conforms to these policies. This author has found the investiga-
tors to be scrupulous and professional in performing their duties. Ken
Bell, for example, has been an investigator for two and a half years. This
muscular, middle-aged African-American loves his job and does it with a
personable, courteous demeanor. During a recent ride-along, Ken de-
scribed the procedures he follows during every consent walk-through.
His investigations take place only during the daylight hours of the work
week. Ken always shows the recipients his identification, gives his name,
and asks whether they have applied for welfare. He explains his purpose
139. Id.
140. CONSENT WALK-THROUGH POLICIES, OFFICE OF THE SAN DIEGO DIsRICT ATTORNEY
(on file with author).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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in coming to their home and empathetically asks about the recipients'
circumstances. He prefers not to do a walk-through but always receives
the recipient's express consent before conducting a search. If a recipient
does not consent to a walk-through or asks to talk with an attorney, Ken
immediately ends the conversation without searching the residence. He
has found, however, that most recipients have a very positive reaction to
the consent request. In fact, many recipients want the investigators to
come inside their home to prevent neighbors from knowing about their
welfare application.
Ken has seen it all. He recalls the woman who applied for aid for her
two children-both of whom had been dead for years. He remembers
parents who applied for welfare while their "crack babies" were still in
the hospital, and he recalls the welfare recipient who not only lived in an
exclusive area of San Diego, but had a maid. Ken, however, works most-
ly in Logan Heights, an area renown for gang activity and crime.
Drunks, drug addicts and prostitutes hang out on the corner. Robberies, burglar-
ies, stabbings and shootings are common. Law-abiding people lock themselves in
their homes with barred windows when the sun goes down.... They know who
are the crack addicts, the junkies and the drunks. And they know that the first
week of each month is the worst, because that's when the ... [welfare] checks
come out. On those nights.... the darkness throughout the neighborhood is bro-
ken by sparks from plastic cigarette lighters that crack addicts use to smoke."
Some area apartment complexes are filled solely with welfare recipients.
Inside many of these graffiti-defaced buildings, the only source of legal
income is the monthly public assistance checks. Welfare fraud is rampant
in Logan Heights, often overwhelming the investigators who are charged
with discovering this form of theft. But Ken Bell and his colleagues un-
derstand the bounds of their duties-to vigorously investigate welfare
fraud while assiduously respecting the rights of the recipients. And, as
will be shown, both the policies and actual practice of these welfare
investigators are wholly consistent with the United States Constitu-
tion. 1
47
146. Punding of Drug Addicts, supna note 89, at G2.
147. See infra Part IH (discussing welfare searches).
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III. THE INVESTIGATORY RUBRICS
"Anytime you can reduce the number of people on any public pro-
gram who aren't qualified to be on it, [you] bring a sense of integri-
ty, and taxpayers don't feel they are being ripped off."
-President Bill Clinton"4
A. The Welfare "Home Visit"
The first analytical tool available to welfare investigators is the "home
visit" espoused by the United States Supreme Court in Wyman v.
James.'49 Unlike the constitutional exceptions based on "reasonable-
ness" or exigencies, the Court has held that home visits do not implicate
any Fourth Amendment protections."5 Although the few judicial opin-
ions interpreting Wyman have varied in their resolutions, boundaries for
this type of warrantless search can be sketched.
1. Pre-Wyman
In Parrish v. Civil Service Commission,' the California Supreme
Court announced its lone opinion on the propriety of welfare searches.
In that case, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors launched a string
of unannounced predawn searches of the homes of county welfare re-
cipients for the express purpose "of detecting the presence of 'unautho-
rized males.'"'52 The program was not performed pursuant to search
warrants, nor was it restricted to the homes of recipients whose welfare
eligibility was in doubt." Instead, a majority of the recipients whose
homes were searched pursuant to "Operation Bedcheck" were "under no
suspicion whatever and were in fact subjected to the raid for that very
reason.
" 154
The California Supreme Court began its opinion by asserting that the
search in question must comply "with the standards which govern
searches for evidence of crime."" It noted that "four separate and in-
dependently sufficient factors" compelled this heightened judicial scruti-
ny." First, the evidence sought by the investigators would have sup-
148. Zuckerman, supra note 13, at 72.
149. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
150. Id. at 318.
151. 425 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1967).
152. Id. at 225.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 228.
156. Id. at 227 (citing Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 361-65 (1959), overruled in
part by Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)). The Parrish court noted
1254
[Vol. 24: 1235, 19971 Welfare Fraud
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ported a criminal prosecution "without further action on their part or
subsequent culpable conduct by the recipient."5 7 Second, the county
was searching for evidence of ineligibility that arguably would have re-
sulted in a type of forfeiture-the canceling of welfare benefits."5
Third, the county did not limit the searches to the homes of recipients
whose welfare eligibility was under suspicion." Finally, the search was
not conducted during working hours and without inconvenience to the
occupants."
The court then rejected the county's contention that the searches were
conducted after the voluntary consent of the welfare recipients and held
that surrounding circumstances vitiated any consent given by the welfare
recipients.' Although the county authorities were instructed to avoid
forcing their way into any home, a refusal to consent to the search could
serve as a basis for terminating welfare benefits. 2 The court stated:
The persons subjected to the instant operation confronted far more than the
amorphous threat of official displeasure which necessarily attends any such re-
quest. The request for entry by persons whom the beneficiaries knew to possess
virtually unlimited power over their very livelihood posed a threat which was far
more certain, immediate, and substantial. These circumstances nullify the legal
effectiveness of the apparent consent secured by the Alameda County search-
ers.1m
The county, therefore, failed to meet its "heavy burden" of showing that
the recipients' consent was freely and voluntarily given."
Moreover, the court reasoned that even a welfare recipient's voluntary
consent would be invalid under the "doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions.""6 The "operation rested upon the assumption that a welfare
agency may withhold aid from recipients who do not willingly submit to
random, exploratory searches of their homes."" Where the receipt of
the Camara case was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court at the time and point-
ed out that the Prank holding was not controlling under the circumstances. Parrish,
425 P.2d at 227 n.7.
157. Id at 227.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 228.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 229-30.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 230.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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"a publicly-conferred benefit" such as welfare is conditioned on the waiv-
er of constitutional rights, the government must establish:
(1) that the conditions reasonably relate to the purposes sought by the legislation
which confers the benefit; (2) that the value accruing to the public from imposi-
tion of those conditions manifestly outweighs any resulting impairment of consti-
tutional rights; and (3) that there are available no alternative means less subver-
sive of constitutional right, narrowly drawn so as to correlate more closely with
the purposes contemplated by conferring the benefit.6 7
Operation Bedcheck, however, failed to meet these requirements. The
county did not limit the scope of the search to individuals suspected of
fraud." In fact, the county authorized the search of non-suspect recipi-
ents to bolster its public appearance.1' Moreover, less intrusive means
were available to detect fraud without constitutional infirmities. Welfare
investigators, the court noted, could have "maintain[ed] an external
watch" to see if unauthorized males entered or left the residence.
71
"[So striking is the disparity between the operation's declared purpose
and the means employed, so broad its gratuitous reach, and so convinc-
ing the evidence that improper considerations dictated its ultimate scope,
that no valid link remains between that operation and its proffered justi-
fication."1
7 1
2. Wyman v. James
Four years after Parrish, the United States Supreme Court announced
"the definitive word on the latitude which circumscribes the authority of
'in home' visits of welfare recipients by the officials administering the
programs."'" In Wyman v. James,'" the plaintiff was a mother of a
two-year-old boy and a recipient of AFDC assistance." A caseworker
informed the plaintiff that a "home visit" was required to verify her eli-
gibility for welfare. 75 The plaintiff, however, refused to allow the visit,
despite an admonition that her failure to consent would result in the
termination of public assistance.'7"
In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court upheld the
home visit procedure and the conditioning of welfare benefits on a
167. Id. at 230-31.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 231-33.
170. Id. at 232.
171. Id. at 231.
172. Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1223 (D. Minn. 1979).
173. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
174. Id. at 313.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 313-14.
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recipient's consent to enter the home. 7 7 The Wyman majority began
with a simple proposition-the welfare agency was not conducting a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.Th The home
visit simply could not be "equated with a search in the traditional crimi-
nal law contexL"1
7
[T]he visitation in itself is not forced or compelled, and... the beneficiary's deni-
al of permission is not a criminal act. If consent to the visitation is withheld, no
visitation takes place. The aid then never begins or merely ceases, as the case
may be. There is no entry of the home and there is no search."'
The Court then concluded that even if the home visit was a search, it
did not fall within the proscription of the Fourth Amendment. '' The
Court reasoned that the search "does not descend to the level of unrea-
sonableness."" The opinion noted eleven factors which made the home
visit reasonable and, therefore, constitutionally permissible:
(1) The focus of public assistance is on the dependent child, not the
parent." The child's needs "are paramount, and only with hesitan-
cy would we relegate those needs, in the scale of comparative val-
ues, to a position secondary to what the mother claims as her
rights."
84
(2) The welfare agency is fulfilling a public trust."4 It "has appropriate
and paramount interest and concern in seeing and assuring that the
intended and proper objects of that tax-produced assistance are the
ones who benefit from the aid it dispenses."8"
(3) Similarly, the public, as provider of the "trust funds," has the right
to know how these resources "are utilized and put to work."
8 7
(4) The emphasis of the home visit "is upon the home, upon 'close
contact' with the beneficiary, upon restoring the aid recipient 'to a
condition of self-support,' and upon the relief of his distress.""
177. Id. at 326.
178. Id. at 317.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 317-18.
181. Id. at 318.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 318-19.
187. Id. at 319.
188. Id.
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Moreover, the search is "concerned about any possible exploitation
of the child."'"
(5) The home visit is an established routine in many states and is "the
heart of welfare administration."'" It "affords 'a personal, rehabili-
tative orientation, unlike that of most federal programs.'""91
(6) The procedures employed minimized "any 'burden' upon the
homeowner's right against unreasonable intrusion." '92 Welfare
recipients were given written notice several days before the pro-
posed home visit.' The notice specified a particular date, and the
entire procedure emphasized privacy." "Forcible entry or entry
under false pretenses or visitation outside working hours or snoop-
ing in the home [were] forbidden."'
(7) The recipient could not complain of any "unreasonable intrusion of
her home" or that the search constituted "the obtaining of informa-
tion as to criminal activity."" There was no "visitation at an awk-
ward hour... no forcible entry.... no snooping [and] no impolite
or reprehensible conduct of any kind."
97
(8) The information necessary to verify welfare eligibility was not ob-
tainable through off-site interviews or by examining records.
These sources "would not always assure verification of actual resi-
dence or of actual physical presence in the home, which are requi-
sites for AFDC benefits, or of impending medical needs."'"
(9) A caseworker conducts the home visit rather than "police or uni-
formed authority."' The "primary objective is, or should be, the
welfare, not the prosecution, of the aid recipient for whom the
worker has profound responsibility."2°'
(10) "The home visit is not a criminal investigation, does not equate with
a criminal investigation, and.., is not in aid of any criminal pro-
ceedings."2" If, however, the visit leads "to the discovery of fraud
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 319-20 (quoting Note, Rehabilitation, Investigation and the Weffare
Home Visit, 79 YALE L J. 746, 748 (1970)).
192. Id. at 321.
193. Id. at 320.
194. Id. at 320-21.
195. Id. at 321.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 321-22.
198. Id. at 322.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 323.
202. Id.
1258
[Vol 24: 1235, 1997] Welfare Fraud
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
and a criminal prosecution should follow,... that is a routine and
expected fact of life and a consequence no greater than that which
necessarily ensues upon any other discovery by a citizen of criminal
conduct. "
(11) A warrant procedure has "seriously objectionable features in the
welfare context. " ' Probable cause "requires more than the mere
need of the caseworker to see the child in the home and to have
assurance that the child is there and is receiving the benefit of the
aid that has been authorized for it."' Even "[i]f a warrant could
be obtained... it presumably could be applied for ex parte, its exe-
cution would require no notice, it would justify entry by force, and
its hours for execution would not be so limited as those prescribed
for home visitation. " " "In this setting the warrant argument is out
of place."
20 7
In concluding that a home visit was not an unreasonable search, the
Court drew an analogy to a civil audit conducted by the Internal Revenue
Service.' If a particular tax deduction is called into question by the
I.R.S., the taxpayer must produce some proof supporting his eligibility
for the deduction.2n If the taxpayer refuses to present the necessary
evidence, he simply loses the deduction.2 0
The taxpayer is fully within his "rights" in refusing to produce the proof, but in
maintaining and asserting those rights a tax detriment results and it is a detriment
of the taxpayer's own maidng. So here [the welfare recipient] has the "right" to
refuse the home visit, but a consequence in the form of cessation of aid, similar to
the taxpayer's resultant additional tax, flows from that refusal. The choice is en-
tirely hers, and nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved."'
Finally, the Court distinguished those precedents which "held that the
Fourth Amendment barred prosecution for refusal to permit the desired
warrantless inspection."2 12 Those cases involved "a true search for vio-
lations."213 "[Ejach case arose in a .criminal context where a genuine
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id at 324.
206. Id. at 323-24 (footnote omitted).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 324.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 325.
213. Id.
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search was denied and prosecution followed."2"4 The statute in this
case, however, did not make a welfare recipient's "refusal a criminal of-
fense."
215
3. Post-Wyman
Although Wyman appeared to be a momentous and far-reaching deci-
sion, there has been a relative dearth of case law applying its principles.
Two post-Wyman cases, however, reveal the fine line between a permis-
sible home visit and an unconstitutional search.
In Reyes v. Edmunds,1 6 four welfare recipients complained that the
Minnesota Department of Public Welfare in Ramsey County was conduct-
ing searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment.217 Ramsey County
established a "Mobile Unit" to investigate possible welfare fraud which
"did not appear.., to be so flagrant as to justify immediate in-depth
criminal investigation or other proceedings."218 Investigators would ask
an alleged welfare offender for permission to enter her home, informing
her that a complaint had been received regarding her eligibility for bene-
fits.2"9 Once inside, the investigators would ask to look around the res-
idence to confirm or contradict the complaint.22 If the recipient denied
the investigators either entry into the home or consent to look around
the residence, the investigators would inform the recipient that the coun-
ty would terminate her welfare benefits due to her failure to consent.22'
If the recipient still refused to allow the search, the investigators would
leave the residence and initiate the termination of welfare benefits.2'
After an interesting discussion of Fourth Amendment principles,'
the federal district court distinguished the procedures of the Mobile Unit
from-those found acceptable in Wyman.' First, "[t]he Mobile Unit was
organized solely to investigate complaints of welfare fraud."22 The in-
vestigators "were not social workers" and their focus was on criminal
fraud rather than assistance, rehabilitation, or prevention of child exploi-
tation.22 Second, recipients received no notice of the impending home
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 472 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Minn. 1979).
217. Id. at 1221.
218. Id
219. Id. at 1221-22.
220. Id. at 1222.
221. Id,
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1222-23.
224. Id. at 1223-26.
225. Id. at 1224.
226. Id.
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visit227 Rather, "[s]nooping within the house was its primary purpose
and the recipient's privacy was decimated. " ' s Third, "[tihe purpose of
the visit was exclusively, solely, and undeniably" to obtain evidence of
criminal activity.'a "This Unit," the district court opined, "was not en-
gaged in social work, but in police work." ' The searches conducted by
the investigators, therefore, fell outside the ambit of Wyman."1 Even
the ostensible consent of some welfare recipients would not vitiate the
unconstitutional nature of the county's procedures.'
Existence upon the largess of the taxpaying public may appear to some to be a
way of life to a segment of society. This jaundiced view should not obscure the
fact that, at best, it is a demeaning status by virtue of, among other things, being
subject to bureaucratic autocracy. What greater inhibition to freedom can there be
than that which a welfare recipient faces when subjected to a threat by the au-
thorities to eliminate her sole means of providing food, shelter and clothing for
her family?. This is coercion in its purest form .... In essence, what the Ramsey
County plan has attempted to do is to condition welfare benefits upon a surrender
to the state of the sanctity of a man's castle. Even a loose reading of Wyman v.
James does not extend that Court's holding to this extreme ....
Accordingly, the district court declared the policies and practices of the
Mobile Unit unconstitutional and enjoined the county from conditioning
welfare benefits upon a recipient's consent to search her home.'
In SL. v. Whitburn,a welfare recipients challenged the procedures
used to verify eligibility for public assistance programs as violating the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Wisconsin, caseworkers used
written criteria to determine whether a welfare applicant provided insuf-
ficient or erroneous information to verify eligibility.' If the caseworker
believed that an applicant's eligibility was questionable, the caseworker
would request a home visit of the applicant's residence. 7 The case-
worker did not obtain a search warrant.'a Rather, "the county [notified]
the applicant that a field representative [would] be visiting the home...
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1225.
231. Id. at 1226.
232. Id. at 1227-28.
233. Id. at 1226.
234. Id. at 1230.
235. 67 F.3d 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
236. Id. at 1302.
237. Id.
238. Id,
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in the next ten days."' Although the field representative must conduct
the visit between 8:00 am. and 8:00 p.m., the county did not inform the
applicant of the exact date or time of the visit.' °
Tracldng the analysis in Wyman, the Seventh Circuit panel first deter-
mined that the home visits were not searches within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment."4 The court noted several factors that compelled
this conclusion. A field representative must receive consent from the
applicant prior to entering the home.'2 Moreover, the representative
must "inform the applicant that she can withdraw her consent to the
home visit at any time."' All inquiries must relate to information re-
quiring verification.' The field representative "can note only things in
plain view or inspect areas of the house or examine closets and open
doors if the occupant gives permission." 245 A refusal to consent to the
visit does not constitute a crime, nor are benefits denied or terminated
based on a failure to consent.'
The court further noted that "Wyman is an unexceptional application
of the principle that the Fourth Amendment's 'prohibition does not ap-
239. Id.
240. The following official procedures are prescribed for all home visits:
[W]hen the field representative makes contact with the applicant, he identifies
himself as a field representative for the County and asks to be admitted to
the home. The representative is not permitted to enter the home without con-
sent. The representative is allowed to tell the applicant that refusal may de-
lay the provision of public assistance, but he may not tell the applicant that
assistance will be automatically denied if permission to enter is refused. The
representative is required to tell the applicant that he or she can retract
consent at any time. Once inside, the representatives are instructed that any-
thing that is in plain view and pertinent to eligibility can be noted. Other-
wise, however, field representatives are told to limit their investigation to the
criteria of eligibility that the caseworker has designated as in need of ver-
ification. Field representatives may ask to see areas of the residence, and
they can ask for permission to inspect closets, cabinets, attics, basements,
garages, etc., but they are forbidden to inspect these areas without the
resident's consent.
Id. Between 1988 and 1995, the home visit program uncovered nearly $3.75 million in
welfare fraud. Dave Daley, County's Surprise Visits OK, MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINE, Oct.
11, 1995, at 1.
241. Whitburn, 67 F.3d at 1307.
242. Id. ("[A] field representative can enter an applicant's home only if the appli-
cant consents.").
243. Id.
244. Id. ("The field representative's inquiries are limited to items in need of verifica-
tion . .. ").
245. Id.
246. Id. ("[T]he applicant's refusal to consent to the home visit is not a criminal
act, and benefits are not denied or cut off because the applicant has refused to al-
low the home visit.").
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ply... to situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained.
'9" 47
Moreover, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a welfare
recipient's consent to a home visit is involuntary as a matter of law.'
This claim, the panel concluded, "defies the whole body of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence which emphasizes that the voluntariness of
consent is a question of fact to be decided in each case." 9 Further, the
court found the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" to be wholly in-
applicable in this context."5 The county forbade field representatives
from informing welfare recipients that their benefits would be terminated
if they refused a home visit. Although the county may, in fact, discontin-
ue benefits if a recipient denies consent for the home visit, "this follows
from the County's inability to verify the applicant's eligibility, not from
the applicant's refusal to allow a home search."25
The court then determined that, "[als in Wyman, the home visits at
issue, even if they are considered searches within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, are reasonable searches that do not violate the Con-
stitution."' The Seventh Circuit noted several factors that demonstrat-
ed the reasonableness of the home visits.' First, a state has a para-
mount interest in ensuring that the public assistance funds accrue to the
intended individuals for the appropriate purposes.' Second, welfare
applicants are given notice of visitation.2" Although a date is not
specified, ani applicant is not penalized if the field representative is un-
able to reach the applicant within the ten days allowed for the visit.'
Third, the visit takes place during normal business hours except in spe-
cial circumstances.nl Fourth, the visit is not conducted by police or
uniformed authority.' And finally, the visit is not a criminal investiga-
tion nor is it done in furtherance of any criminal proceeding.' "Rather,
the purpose of these home visits [is] to verify an applicant's eligibility for
247. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990)).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1307-08.
250. Id at 1308.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1308-09.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1309.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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public assistance consistent with the public trust."2' Based on these
considerations, the court held that the policy was reasonable and, there-
fore, consistent with the Fourth Amendment.26'
Finally, the welfare recipients argued that the due process guarantee of
the Fourteenth Amendment "requires the County to give applicants no-
tice that they can prevent home visits by providing adequate documenta-
tion."" The court summarily rejected this claim."8' The recipients re-
ceived sufficient due process through the written notice procedure and
the opportunity to. contact the appropriate government body "to protest
the home visit and provide additional documentation to confirm eligibili-
ty.
264
4. Legal Synthesis
Although these four cases reach different conclusions, one can harmo-
nize their principles. To navigate the legal straits of these decisions, a
home visit policy must satisfy two requirements. First, the visit cannot be
made for the purposes of criminal investigation, furthering criminal pros-
ecution, or gathering evidence of criminal activity.' Administrative
purposes that do not implicate the criminal justice system, however, can
serve as valid and laudable goals. These purposes include: (1) ascertain-
ing whether an applicant is eligible for welfare, and thereby confirming
that the public trust is being fulfilled;"M (2) ensuring the health and wel-
fare of dependent children and preventing the exploitation of chil-
dren;267 and (3) maintaining close contact with the recipients and help-
ing to restore them to a condition of self-support.' This list is not ex-
haustive. A great variety of goals might satisfy this constitutional prong.
Second, the procedures followed in conducting a home visit must be
"reasonable." "6 This, of course, is a relative term which cries out for a
"totality of the circumstances" analysis. 7 ° A few seemingly mandatory
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1311.
264. Id.
265. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 322-25 (1971); Whitburn, 67 F.3d at 1309; Reyes
v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1224-25 (D. Minn. 1979); Parrish v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 425 P.2d 223, 227 (Cal. 1967).
266. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 319; Whitburn, 67 F.3d at 1309; Parrish, 425 P.2d at 230.
267. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318-19; Whitburn, 67 F.3d at 1308-09; Reyes, 472 F. Supp.
at 1224.
268. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 319.
269. Id. at 318-22; Whitburn, 67 F.3d at 1308-09; Reyes, 472 F. Supp. at 1224-26;
Parrish, 425 P.2d at 230-31.
270. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318-24.
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constraints, however, are worth noting. Some form of written notice of
an impending home visit should be delivered to recipients, although the
exact date and time of the visit need not be stated.2 7' Visits during non-
business hours should be avoided, and predawn "raids" are undoubtedly
unreasonable.2" Moreover, mass searches probably are the presumption
of invalidity.' The visit should be conducted by a caseworker or wel-
fare investigator, rather than by police officers or uniformed authori-
ty." The privacy of the recipient must be emphasized-snooping or en-
try by false pretenses is unacceptable.275 Impolite or reprehensible con-
duct could render the home visit legally defective.2 1 In addition, the re-
cipient should not be threatened with termination of welfare benefits
unless the recipient consents to the visit. This does not mean, however,
that a recipient who denies entry cannot have her benefits discontinued.
So long as the termination of welfare resulted from an inability to verify
the recipient's eligibility, and not from her refusal to allow a home
search, there is no constitutional violation.2
B. Consent Searches
Voluntary consent is the most celebrated and utilized exception to the
Fourth Amendment's probable cause and warrant requirements. As noted
by the United States Supreme Court, "[A] search conducted pursuant to a
valid consent is constitutionally permissible."' Consent is "one of the
specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant
and probable cause."2' Although challenged by many civil libertarians,
searches pursuant to valid consent are not inherently coercive.' "The
Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures; it
does not proscribe voluntary cooperation.""' The Fourth Amendment
requires only that law enforcement "demonstrate that the consent was in
fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express
271. Id at 320-21; Whitburn, 67 F.3d at 1311; Reyes, 472 F. Supp. at 1224.
272. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 320-21; Parrish, 425 P.2d at 232.
273. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 320-22.
274. Id. at 322-23; Reyes, 472 F. Supp. at 1224-25.
275. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 320-21; Reyes, 472 F. Supp. at 1224.
276. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 320-21.
277. Id. at 324; S.L v. Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299, 1308 (7th Cir. 1995).
278. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
279. Id. at 219.
280. Cf. id. at 247.
281. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
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or implied." m Unlike constitutional guarantees that protect the integrity
and fairness of a criminal trial, a "waiver" of the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures need not be knowing and intelli-
gent.' It need only be voluntary.'s
The consent exception to the Fourth Amendment is of vital importance
both to law enforcement and the public at large. The benefits are monu-
mental, though often overlooked.
In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack prob-
able cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be the
only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence.... And in those cases
where there is probable cause to arrest or search, but where the police lack a
warrant, a consent search may still be valuable. If the search is conducted and
proves fruitless, that in itself may convince the police that an arrest with its possi-
ble stigma and embarrassment is unnecessary, or that a far more extensive search
pursuant to a warrant is not justified. In short, a search pursuant to consent may
result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search, and, prop-
erly conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of
effective police activity.'
In contrast, a search pursuant to coerced consent flies in the face of
both the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.2" Such
searches smack of inquisition and brutal police tactics of the past. An
involuntary consent is no consent at all-it is the antithesis of permis-
sion.
The following sections sketch the parameters of constitutional consent
searches. Although judicial analysis of consent searches in the welfare
context is wanting, the body of jurisprudence on standard criminal con-
sent searches provides appropriate legal boundaries.
1. Voluntariness
"Voluntariness" is not easily defined. As noted by the Court, there is
"no talismanic definition of 'voluntariness,' mechanically applicable to the
host of situations where the question has arisen.... [N]either linguistics
nor epistemology will provide a ready definition of the meaning of
'voluntariness.'"27 Justice Frankfurter once reasoned that "'[tihe notion
of 'voluntariness' is itself an amphibian. '"'
In defining voluntariness in the consent search context, two competing
values must be reconciled: "the legitimate need for such searches and the
282. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.
283. Id. at 235-46.
284. Id. at 234.
285. Id. at 227-28.
286. Id. at 228.
287. Id. at 224.
288. Id. (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 604-05 (1961)).
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equally important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion. " '
To meet these concerns, the United States Supreme Court has resolved
that voluntariness must be tested by all relevant facts presented before
the tribunal. "[Wihether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or
was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances."'
Only by weighing all facts related to the ostensible consent can it be
determined whether an individual's "will has been overborne and his
capacity for self-determination critically impaired." 9 ' This determina-
tion is made by the trial court as the trier of fact and law in the first
instance.' As with all warrantless searches, the government bears the
burden of proof,2. and voluntariness must be shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 4
The following list of factors have been included in the "totality of the
circumstances" when determining the voluntariness of a consent to
search. It should be noted, however, that this list is not exhaustive, nor
is any single factor controlling. Rather, the total weight of all relevant
factors guides the ultimate decision.
Characteristics of Individual Consenting to Search
* Age
" Education'
* Intelligence 7
" Ability to see and hear'
289. Id at 227.
290. Id,; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980) (stating the
proposition that consent should be determined from the totality of the circumstanc-
es).
291. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.
292. People v. James, 561 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Cal. 1977); People v. Shandloff, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 916, 922 (Ct. App. 1985).
293. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983);. Mendenhali, 446 U.S. at 557;
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222; James, 561 P.2d at 1138; Shandloff, 215 Cal. Rptr. at
922.
294. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177-78 n.14 (1974); James, 561 P.2d at
1138 n.4.
295. MendenhaU, 446 U.S. at 558-59; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.
296. Mendenhal, 446 U.S. at 558-59, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 248; People v.
Obie, 116 Cal. Rptr. 283, 287 (Ct. App. 1974).
297. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 425 (1976); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.
298. Obie, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
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* Race, as compared to that of officers'
* Legal knowledge or experience with criminal justice system'
Circumstances of Individual Immediately Prior to Consent
* Under arrest'
* In custodya
* Handcuffed'n
* Location where consent requested (e.g., at home, at police station,
on street)'
* Number of officers present'
* Whether officers are uniformed
Actions and Statements by Individual Consenting to Search
" Initially refusing to consent' "
* Refusing to assist in gaining entry'
* Requesting a justification for the search"
* Asking whether officers have a search warrant3 0
* Asking to be left alone3" '
" Defying, opposing, or resisting search312
Actions and Statements by Law Enforcement
" Failure to give Miranda warnings 313
" Failure to warn of right to refuse consent "
" Failure to warn that evidence uncovered during search could be
used in court"'5
299. Mendenhal, 446 U.S. at 558.
300. Watson, 423 U.S. at 424-25; People v. James, 561 P.2d 1135, 1146 (Cal. 1977).
301. Watson, 423 U.S. at 424; People v. Smith, 409 P.2d 222, 235 (Cal. 1966); People
v. Shelton, 388 P.2d 665, 668 (Cal. 1964).
302. Watson, 423 U.S. at 424.
303. People v. Ratliff, 715 P.2d 665, 671 (Cal. 1986); James, 561 P.2d at 1140.
304. Mendenhoi, 446 U.S. at 559.
305. People v. Poole, 227 Cal. Rptr. 594, 598 (Ct App. 1986).
306. People v. Munoz, 101 Cal. Rptr. 265, 268 (Ct. App. 1972).
307. Lane v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. Rptr. 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1969).
308. People v. Shelton, 388 P.2d 665, 668 (Cal. 1964).
309. Crofoot v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Ct. App. 1981).
310. Id.; Lane, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
311. Crofoot, 175 Cal Rptr. at 535.
312. People v. Munoz, 101 Cal. Rptr. 265, 267-68 (Ct. App. 1972).
313. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 425 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
314. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 554, .558-59 (1980); Watson, 423 U.S. at
425; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248; People v. James, 561 P.2d 1135, 1146 (Cal. 1977).
315. Watson, 423 U.S. at 425.
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" Length of pre-consent questioning18
" Requesting that individual step outside of residence
17
" Making promises of leniency"8
* Attempting to surprise, frighten, or confuse individual319
" Using subtle forms of coercion °
" Threats or displays of force"1
" Whether weapons were drawns
Many of these factors, however, will never come into play in the welfare
context. Public assistance fraud investigators do not wear uniforms, do
not use handcuffs, do not carry weapons, and do not place recipients
under arrest or in custody. In addition, none of the foregoing factors is
necessarily determinative. For example, the judiciary has consistently
held that failure to inform an individual of his right to refuse consent'n
or rights under Miranda' does not automatically vitiate permission to
search.' Nor is consent necessarily involuntary because the individual
has been arrested 8 or is in handcuffs."2 Instead, each of these fac-
tors must be collectively weighed by the trial court.
316. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558.
317. Lane v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. Rptr. 895, 897 (Ct App. 1969).
318. Watson, 423 U.S. at 424; People v. Shandloff, 215 Cal. Rptr. 915, 922 (Ct. App.
1985).
319. People v. Poole, 227 Cal. Rptr. 594, 599 (Ct. App. 1986).
320. Watson, 423 U.S. at 424. For example, in Crofoot v. Superior Court, an officer
coerced a defendant by stating that the defendant "'shouldn't have any objections to
[him] looking in the backpack if he weren't doing anything.'" Crofoot v. Superior
Court, 175 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Ct. App. 1981). The Crofoot court stated that this was
the equivalent of saying "By exercising your constitutional right to withhold consent
from me to search the backpack you will be admitting to me that you have done
something wrong; it is better to let me search the pack and discover for myself. You
cannot leave until you give consent." Id.
321. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558; Watson, 423 U.S. at 424; Shandloff, 215 Cal. Rptr.
at 922.
322. Shandoff, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
323. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 424; Schnecldoth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233
(1972); People v. James, 561 P.2d 1135, 1143-46 (Cal. 1977); People v. Gurtenstein,
138 Cal. Rptr. 161, 166.67 (Ct. App. 1977); People v. Roberts, 55 Cal. Rptr. 62, 64-65
(Ct. App. 1966).
324. People v. Ratliff, 715 P.2d 665, 670-71 (Cal. 1986); James, 561 P.2d at 1143-44.
325. Ratilif, 715 P.2d at 670-71; James, 561 P.2d at 1143-44.
326. James, 561 P.2d at 1140-41; People v. Smith, 400 P.2d 222, 235 (Cal. 1966).
327. James, 561 P.2d at 1141; Rat'iff, 715 P.2d at 670-71.
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There are some facts, however, that should be irrelevant to the ulti-
mate determination. For example, a search is not involuntary merely
because consenting to the search would not be in the individual's best
interests. There are many reasons why someone might consent to search.
Judicial inquiry into an individual's subjective reasoning is fraught with
peril.'2 As argued by the United States Supreme Court, "[T]he question
is not whether the [individual] acted in her ultimate self-interest, but
whether she acted voluntarily."' Moreover, law enforcement's initial
decision to ask an individual for consent to search generally should not
factor into the voluntariness equation. The government need not support
its consent query with suspicion of criminal activity or "some level of
objective justification."33 So long as "a reasonable person would feel
free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encoun-
ter,"33' or "'to disregard the police and go about his business,' the en-
counter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required." 2 The
acts and words which precede the request, and the manner in which the
query is presented, should guide the court's analysis. The decision to
request consent to search, in and of itself, is a neutral consideration.
Although the judiciary has extolled the "totality of the circumstances"
formulation, there are a few situations where appellate courts have ap-
parently "pre-balanced" the issue of voluntariness. For example, when an
occupant obliviously says "come in" in response to a knock at the door,
he cannot later claim that consent to enter the residence was involun-
tary. In such cases, "the only event which induced consent to the
officers' entry was the sound of knocking at the door.... For all [the
occupants] knew or apparently cared, they might have been extending
328. See, e.g., James, 561 P.2d at 1143.
Contrary to defendant's implication, there may be a number of "rational rea-
sons" for a suspect to consent to a search even though he knows the pre-
mises contain evidence that can be used against him: for example, he may
wish to appear cooperative in order to throw the police off the scent or at
least to lull them into conducting a superficial search; he may believe the
evidence is of such a nature or in such a location that it is likely to be
overlooked; he may be persuaded that if the evidence is nevertheless discov-
ered he will be successful in explaining its presence or denying any knowl-
edge of it; he may intend to lay the groundwork for ingratiating himself with
the prosecuting authorities or the courts; or he may simply be convinced that
the game is up and further dissembling is futile.
Id.
329. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 344, 559 (1980).
330. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983); see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
434 (1990).
331. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.
332. Id. at 434 (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (citation
omitted).
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their invitation to an unwelcome acquaintance, a curious parent, an irate
neighbor, or a thief."'
Most of the circumstances involving "pre-balancing," however, entail
,conduct so coercive as to make consent per se involuntary. Consent
obtained by overt threats and force, or by mere acquiescence to a claim
of authority, is involuntary as a matter of law.' For example, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court announced in Bumper v. North Carolina:'
"When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home un-
der a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to
resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably
lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.""
The Court, therefore, established "a marker, inserted along the spec-
trum evincing various circumstances from consent as a matter of law,
through conflicting circumstances, to nonconsent as a matter of law." 7
"[R]eference to a search warrant," opined a California appellate court
interpreting Bumper, "is such a claim of lawful authority that it will as a
matter of law preclude reliance on consent or acquiescence thereafter
elicited."' So when law enforcement prefaces a consent request with
"I have a search warrant" or "a search warrant is en route," " any sub-
sequent permission to search will be considered involuntary.'
Coercion as a matter of law can take many forms. An officer might
demand entry into the home-"open the door"--or claim a right to
333. Mann v. Superior Court, 472 P.2d 468, 472 (Cal. 1970).
334. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968); People v. Linke, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 371, 375-76 (Ct App. 1968).
335. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
336. Id. at 550.
337. Linke, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
338. Id. at 376.
339. People v. Baker, 231 Cal. Rptr. 877, 882-83 (Ct App. 1986).
340. The clarity of this per se rule has been obscured by subsequent tautological
distinctions. The California appellate courts have opined that police claims such as
.we will get a search warrant [unless you consent]," People v. Ruster, 548 P.2d 353,
359 (Cal. 1976), overruled by People v. Jenkins, 620 P.2d 587 (Cal. 1980), or "[we
will] secure a search warrant [unless you consent]," People v. Ratliff, 715 P.2d 665,
671 (Cal. 1986), or "[we will] go down and apply for a search warrant [unless you
consent]," People v. Gurtenstein, 138 Cal. Rptr. 161, 166 (Ct App. 1977), "merely
amounted to a declaration of the officers' legal remedies should defendant refuse to
cooperate." Ratlif, 715 P.2d at 671. Moreover, reference to an arrest warrant, rather
than a search warrant, does not unequivocally result in an involuntary consent. Linke,
71 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
341. People v. Poole, 227 Cal. Rptr. 594, 597 (Ct App. 1986).
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enter-"I have come to make a search." 2 Law enforcement might state
that resistance would be "unwise or fruitless."' Consent might result
from unmitigated harassment, intimidation, or threats.' 4 One federal
agent went so far as to threaten to take a parent's children into custody
unless he consented to a search." Consent also might be deemed "fruit
of the poisonous tree." There can be no voluntary consent following an
illegal detention,' an illegal arrest4 7 an illegal search," or an il-
legal entry.
4 9
Ultimately, police coercion not only vitiates consent and invalidates
the search but also jeopardizes the admissibility of subsequent confes-
sions or searches.' Police tactics that derogate an individual's consti-
tutional rights are unacceptable in any context.
2. Implied Consent
Consent can take many forms, and "there is no talismanic phrase
which must be uttered by a suspect in order to authorize a search."" -
Consent has been judicially inferred from a multitude of phrases. "Yes,"
"Yeah," "Go ahead," "I don't care," and "Do what you want" have all been
interpreted as voluntary permission to search.52 But voluntary consent
has also been implied from statements which do not encompass affirma-
tive permission. As noted by the California judiciary, "Words may imply
consent as well as express it."' For example, disclaiming any interest
in some property is "virtually the equivalent of an implied consent to
search."' Also, stating the location of an item implies consent to
search for it55
342. People v. Munoz, 101 Cal. Rptr. 265, 268 (Ct. App. 1972); see also Lane v.
Superior Court, 76 Cal. Rptr. 895, 898 (Ct App. 1986); People v. Cove, 39 Cal. Rptr.
535, 537 (Ct. App. 1964).
343. People v. James, 561 P.2d 1135, 1142 (Cal. 1977).
344. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1990); Munoz, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
345. United States v. Hatley, 999 F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir. 1993).
346. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1983).
347. James, 561 P.2d at 1140; People v. Havens, 381 P.2d 927, 930 (Cal. 1963); Peo-
ple v. Baker, 231 Cal. Rptr. 877, 887 (Ct. App. 1986).
348. James, 561 P.2d at 1140; Baker, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
349. James, 561 P.2d at 1140; Havens, 381 P.2d at 930; People v. Poole, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 594, 598 (Ct. App. 1986); Munoz, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
350. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 260 Cal. Rptr. 293, 296 (subsequent search); Poole,
227 Cal Rptr. at 599 (subsequent confession).
351. James, 561 P.2d at 1143.
352. Id.; People v. Carrillo, 412 P.2d 377, 380 (Cal. 1966) ("go ahead"); People v.
Perillo, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 163 (Ct. App. 1969) ("I don't care"); People v. Linke, 71
Cal. Rptr. 371, 381 (Ct. App. 1968) ("come right ahead").
353. People v. Superior Court (Henry), 116 Cal. Rptr. 24, 26 (Ct. App. 1974).
354. People v. Mendoza, 224 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (Ct App. 1986).
355. See Superior Court (Henry), 116 Cal. Rptr. at 26, and cases cited therein; see
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Moreover, "no words at all need be spoken: in appropriate circum-
stances, consent to enter may be unmistakably manifested by a gesture
alone."" Opening the door and stepping back, 7 extending one's hand
toward the entrance of a residence," and handing over the keys to a
door' have all been viewed as forms of implied consent to enter and
search. But a failure to object to the search can never be construed as an
implied consent.' Resting upon implied consent is inviting peril; ex-
press consent is invariably preferable to relying upon judicial
speculation.
3. Third Party Consent
The Fourth Amendment only protects an individual from unreasonable
searches and seizures." The Fourth Amendment does not guarantee
that a search will only be conducted if a particular resident consents.'
"The consent of one person with common or superior authority over the
area to be searched is all that is required; the consent of other interested
parties is unnecessary."' In the welfare context, therefore, it is not dis-
positive that the recipient was not the individual that consented to the
search.'
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court declared that valid consent
need not be conferred by an individual with personal or proprietary in-
terests at stake.' Rather, permission can be "obtained from a third
party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relation-
also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 486 (1971) (holding that identifying
location of guns implied consent). Though not synonymous with implied or express
consent, abandonment of property confers an unfettered authority to search without
having to comply with the Fourth Amendment's strictures. People v. Smith, 409 P.2d
222, 235-36 (Cal. 1966).
356. James, 561 P.2d at 1143; People v. Harrington, 471 P.2d 961, 963 (Cal. 1970).
357. People v. Martino, 212 Cal. Rptr. 45, 52 (Ct. App. 1985); People v. Cove, 39
Cal. Rptr. 535, 537-38 (CL App. 1964).
358. Harrington, 471 P.2d at 963.
359. People v. Guyette, 41 Cal. Rptr. 875, 878 (Ct. App. 1964).
360. People v. Timms, 224 Cal. Rptr. 434, 437 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Harrington,
471 P.2d at 963); People v. Superior Court (Arketa), 89 Cal. Rptr. 316, 319 (Ct App.
1970).
361. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
362. illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990).
363. People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099, 1116 (Cal. 1993).
364. Cf United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
365. Id.
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ship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."' The Court
was careful not to constrain law enforcement by the often-archaic prop-
erty jurisprudence:
Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property interest
a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party
consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and
legal refinements, but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons ge -
erally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in
his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number
might permit the common area to be searched.3 7
Moreover, actual common authority to consent need not be proven."
Instead, the individual permitting the search must have apparent com-
mon authority to do so.3e The test is an objective standard of reason-
ableness: "[W]ould the facts available to the officer at the moment ...
'warrant a man of reasonable caution to the belief that the consenting
party had authority over the premises?"37 In the words of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, "[TIhere must be some objective evidence of joint
control or access to the places or items to be searched which would
indicate that the person authorizing the search has the authority to do
so.""' So long as the investigator reasonably and in good faith believed
that an individual had authority to consent, there is no constitutional
366. Id. at 171.
367. Id. at n.7 (citing Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Stoner v. Cali-
fornia, 376 U.S. 483 (1964)) (citations omitted).
368. People v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990).
369. Id. at 185-86; People v. Jacobs, 729 P.2d 757, 762-63 (Cal. 1987) (finding elev-
en-year-old child's consent to police search was unreasonable because child lacked
apparent authority even though parents had left her alone to baby-sit her two youn-
ger siblings); People v. Bishop, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, 63941 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that estranged wife, who had moved to battered women's shelter, maintained author-
ity to consent to search of husband's house); People v. Cooney, 286 Cal. Rptr. 765,
768 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1991) (finding daughter did not have reasonable apparent
authority to consent to her mother's locked closet because she did not have a key to
the padlock); People v. Roman, 278 Cal. Rptr. 44, 47-48 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
landlord did not have apparent authority to consent to search of tenant's garage with-
out showing that tenant had been evicted, abandoned the property, or had granted
landlord authority to enter premises). Of course, the government bears the burden of
proving apparent common authority. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181.
370. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1967)).
371. Jacobs, 729 P.2d at 762. For example, apparent authority to consent has been
found where an individual "present at and in charge of the premises has in his pos-
session the keys to the premises and willingly permits the officers to enter." People
v. Corrao, 20 Cal. Rptr. 492, 495 (Ct. App. 1962).
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violation.372 The Fourth Amendment does not guarantee that govern-
ment investigators "always be correct, but that they always be reason-
able."3"
Third party consent, both valid and defective, can arise from many
types of business and personal relationships. As a matter of law, hotel
employees374 and landlords3 75 cannot consent to searches of their
tenants' current residences.378 A spouse, on the other hand, can consent
to a thorough residential search almost without exception.7 7 This is
true even when the spouse's husband or wife is in custody or confined in
jail,3 'h or when severe antagonism marks the marital relationship.3'
Moreover, ostensible spouses and paramours can manifest sufficient
indices of common authority to validly consent to a search.s Parents
generally have vast authority to permit searches of their minor children's
rooms and effects.31 A child's "occupancy is subservient to the control
of his parents.... They may enter and search the room at will, or may
authorize others to make such a search. " ' Conversely, however, a
372. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 184.
373. Id. at 185.
374. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 487-90 (1964).
375. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961); People v. Roman, 278
Cal. Rptr. 44, 48 (Ct. App. 1991).
376. However, a landlord or hotel employee can consent to a search of common
areas. Corrao, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 495. Moreover, a tenant who has been evicted or has
abandoned the residence has no standing to object to a landlord's consent to search.
Roman, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 48; People v. Superior Court (York), 83 Cal. Rptr. 732, 737-
38 (Ct App. 1970).
377. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-90 (1971); People v. Reyes, 526
P.2d 225, 234 (Cal. 1974) ("The wife of a suspect may consent to a search of the
residence.").
378. People v. Ingle, 348 P.2d 577, 582-83 (Cal. 1960).
379. People v. Bishop, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, 639-40 (Ct. App. 1996).
380. People v. Smith, 409 P.2d 222, 235-36 (Cal. 1966); People v. Munoz, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 265, 268-69 (Ct. App. 1972).
381. People v. Daniels, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628, 630-32 (Ct. App. 1971); Vandenberg v.
Superior Court, 87 Cal. Rptr. 876, 879-80 (Ct. App. 1970).
382. Daniels, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 632. In Vandenberg, the court stated:
In his capacity as the owner of the legal interest in the property, a father
can transfer to the police the limited right to enter and search the entire
premises including that portion of the real property which has been designat-
ed by the parent for the use of his children.... In his capacity as the head
of the household, a father has the responsibility and authority for the dis-
cipline, training and control of his children. In the exercise of his parental
authority a father has full access to the room set aside for his son for pur-
poses of fulfilling his right and duty to control his son's social behavior and
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child usually does not have actual or apparent authority to permit a
search of the parent's residence.' A child's interest in the family home
is subservient to that of the parent; the minor does not have coequal do-
minion. "Although parents may choose to grant their minor children joint
access and mutual use of the home, parents normally retain control of
the home as well as the power to rescind the authority they have
given." ' There are, of course, exceptions to this rule.sa But consent
to search given by a minor child should generally be considered invalid.
The most difficult questions in the law of third party consent involve
the generic roommate. Generally, a cotenant can consent to a search of
all areas of joint control.' A roommate, for example, could consent to
the search of a common kitchen or living room." The issue becomes
tricky, however, when one or more cotenants are away from the resi-
dence or disagree as to whether to consent to the search. A cotenant
present in the residence may validly consent to a search of common
areas regardless of whether the defendant is inside.' Moreover, a pres-
to obtain obedience.
Vandenberg, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 880. The California. Supreme Court, however, has ruled
that "[c]ommon authority over personal property may not be implied from the father's
proprietary interest in the premises." In re Scott K, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671, 676 (Ct. App.
1979). Thus, while a parent may authorize the search of his minor child's room, he
does not necessarily have authority to permit a search of the child's locked personal
effects. See id.
383. People v. Jacobs, 729 P.2d 757, 762-63 (Cal. 1981).
384. Id.
385. The Jacobs court noted:
We do not suggest that consent by a minor will be ineffective in all cases in
which no adult occupants are present. As a child advances in age she ac-
quires greater discretion to admit visitors on her own authority. In some
circumstances, a teenager may possess sufficient authority to allow the police
to enter and look about common areas. Exceptional circumstances also may
justify a search that otherwise would be illegal. For example, some courts
have upheld searches made at the request of a child or when a child is the
victim of or a witness to a crime.
See id. at 764.
386. People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099, 1116 (Cal. 1993) ("Thus, objects left in an area
of common use or control may be within the scope of the consent given by a third
party for a search of the common area"); see People v. Boyer, 768 P.2d 610, 626
(Cal. 1989) ("When one cotenant with joint control of the area to be searched is
present on the premises, he or she may consent to the search despite the absence of
others."); see also People v. Wilkins, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743, 749 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating
that a search is reasonable if one of the joint occupants consents and is present
during the search); People v. McClelland, 186 Cal. Rptr. 365, 366 (Ct. App. 1982)
(stating that the cotenant has authority to consent to a search of the common areas).
387. See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
388. People v. Veiga, 262 Cal. Rptr. 919, 925 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1973)).
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ent cotenant can consent to a search over the refusal or objections of
another tenant who is also present at the residence.'s Likewise, when a
roommate is away from the premises, an absent cotenant can consent to
a search.' An absent cotenant, however, may not validly consent when
her roommate is present and refuses to consent to the search.- 1
The California Supreme Court has acknowledged the intrinsic hazards
of cotenant consent, and has warned against governmental abuse:
We have recognized that the assumption of risk inherent in co-occupancy has its
limits. An entry or search, even though authorized by a co-occupant, may be so
intrusive that it belies the conclusion that the parties assumed or even contem-
plated the risk of its occurrence by deciding to jointly inhabit the subject resi-
dence. For instance, an absent cotenant cannot authorize the police to burst into
occupied premises unannounced if there is no emergency justifying such a fright-
ening intrsion.'
Cotenants cannot consent to a search of occupied bedrooms and bath-
rooms because the inhabitant of these rooms "is entitled to an expecta-
tion of privacy far greater than those persons in the common areas of a
house, such as the living room and kitchen." ' Moreover, a cotenant
cannot consent to a search of private bedrooms in which she maintains
no joint control.' The right to privacy trumps expedience in such cir-
cumstances-as it should.
4. The Scope of Consent
The scope of consent delineates the time, place, and extent of a
search. As with the issue of voluntariness, the appropriate scope of a
search is a factual issue judged by the totality of the circumstances. 5
389. Wilkins, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 751; People v. Engel, 164 Cal. Rptr. 454, 461 (Ct.
App. 1980) (stating that cotenant could validly consent to the search of an area
where she had a possessory right).
390. People v. Smith, 409 P.2d 222, 235-36 (Cal. 1966).
391. Tompkins v. Superior Court, 378 P.2d 113, 116 (Cal. 1963) (holding that "one
joint occupant who is away from the premises may not authorize police officers to
enter and search the premises over the objection of another joint occupant who is
present at the time"). When a present tenant neither expressly objects nor is asked
for his consent, however, there is some judicial authority for an absent tenant validly
consenting to a search. Veiga, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
392. People v. Haskett, 640 P.2d 776, 786 (Cal. 1982).
393. Young v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (Ct. App. 1976).
394. Beach v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr. 200, 202 (Ct. App. 1970).
395. People v. Crenshaw, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 174 (CL App. 1992); People v. Engel,
164 Cal. Rptr. 454, 461 (Ct App. 1980).
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As articulated by the United States Supreme Court, the scope of a con-
sent search is measured by "'objective' reasonableness-what would the
typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the
officer and the suspect?" ' Law enforcement is limited "by the mutual
understanding and reasonable expectations of the parties," and the gov-
ernment bears the burden of showing that a warrantless search was
within the scope of consent. 7 The individual permitting the search can
expressly limit the scope of his consent.'
[T]he "scope" of a consent may be determined equally from reasonable implica-
tions derived from a person's express words and conduct as well as from a
person's express words which require no implications. The concept of an officer's
"reasonable expectations" is simply that of the "reasonable person" test-the right
of a hearer to draw inferences from another's express words and conduct'
For example, an individual's failure to object to the extension or continu-
ation of a search may indicate that the scope of consent was not exceed-
ed.4
Two considerations guide the scope of any particular search. First,
"the search must be limited in scope to that which is justified by the
particular purposes served by the exception" to the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment."°) For example, a warrantless search inci-
dent to a lawful arrest is premised on officer safety and preservation of
evidence.' Such concerns, however, only validate a search of the ar-
restee and the area within his immediate control-not his house two
blocks away.' Second, "[tihe scope of a search is generally defined by
its expressed object."' For example, consent to search the interior of
a car includes within its scope permission to examine a paper bag lying
396. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (quoting minois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 117, 183-89 (1990)).
397. People v. Harwood, 141 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (Ct. App. 1977).
398. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252; Crenshaw, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 175; People v. Marti-
nez, 65 Cal. Rptr. 920, 922 (Ct. App. 1968).
399. Engel, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 463 (affiraing the denial of the defendant's suppression
motion because his girlfriend claimed communal ownership of the boxes that were
searched and specifically consented to the search of one box).
400. United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1515 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding a consen-
sual search of the rear quarter panel of an automobile to be valid because the defen-
dant did not object to the scope of the search); United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d
888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986) (concluding, under the totality of the circumstances, that the
defendant's failure to object, detract, or narrow the search of his automobile indicat-
ed that the police search was reasonable).
401. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
402. Id.; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
403. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
404. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991); People v. Crenshaw, 12 Cal. Rptr.
2d 172, 174 (Ct. App. 1992) (upholding search of defendant's car when he knew that
the authorities wanted to search for drugs and placed no limitations on the search).
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on the vehicle's floor.' Consent to search the trunk of a car, however,
does not authorize law enforcement to pry open a locked briefcase found
inside the trunk." And permission to search the interior of a vehicle
does not license an inspection of the trunk, or vice versa.' Moreover,
consent may be withdrawn at any time before the search is complet-
ed.08
Generally, law enforcement does not need separate permission to
search containers within the scope of the original consent. For example,
agreeing to a search of one's suitcase necessarily includes consent to
search pouches and envelopes within the luggage." Similarly, permis-
sion to search a tote bag authorizes a search of a container within the
bag which can be opened without "a key, knowledge of a combination,
or anything other than merely removing the lid.""' But consent to "look
around" a residence does not include within its scope permission to
search closed suitcases and sealed boxes." Searches of locked rooms
and containers always require independent consent, despite their appar-
ent inclusion within the original scope of the search4 1 2
405. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.
406. Id
407. People v. Martinez, 65 Cal. Rptr. 920, 922 (Ct App. 1968). Many other exam-
ples have been provided by judicial opinion. "Consent to search a barn does not
authorize search of a cellar not connected with the barn." Id. (holding search of an
automobile to be unconstitutional when the defendant said, "Search me"). Even the
most comprehensive consent to a vehicular search would not include permission to
slash open a spare tire. United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 942 (11th Cir.
1990). And consent to search for a man seen running toward a house would not
include permission to probe for burglars tools. People v. Superior Court (Arketa), 89
Cal. Rptr. 316, 319 (Ct. App. 1970).
408. People v. Gurtenstein, 138 CaL Rptr. 161, 167 (Ct App. 1977); Martinez, 65
Cal. Rptr. at 922.
-409. People v. Shandioff, 215 Cal. Rptr. 916, 922 (Ct. App. 1985).
410. United States v. Springs, 936 F.2d 1330, 1334-35 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
411. People v. Cruz, 395 P.2d 889, 892 (Cal. 1964); People v. Murillo, 50 Cal. Rptr.
290, 293 (Ct. App. 1966) (holding that consent to search an apartment did not include
consent to use a key found in the search to open the defendant's attachd case).
412. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1991); People v. Cooney, 286 Cal. Rptr.
765, 768 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that consent to search a house did not include
consent to search a locked closet inside the house). It should be noted, however,
that everything within plain view is subject to search and seizure. People v. Szabo,
165 Cal. Rptr. 719, 725 (Ct App. 1980).
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5. Consent Searches in the Welfare Context
Although the purposes of welfare consent searches are different than
those in the criminal investigation context, the relevant considerations
and limitations are analogous. Welfare investigators must be cognizant of
the circumstances surrounding a request for consent to search. It should
be remembered that reasonableness is the ultimate test and that every-
thing said or done can be incorporated into the totality of the circum-
stances. The best course is to stay well within the bounds of the Consti-
tution, avoiding the legal gray areas subject to unbridled judicial discre-
tion. If someone traverses the fine line between validity and illegality, he
is likely to be hauled into court to explain his actions, words, and mo-
tives.
Consent to search should be unequivocal, and implied consent should
be avoided. "May I have consent to come in?"-or words to that ef-
fect-should preface a recipient's permission, and ambiguous responses
should be followed up with, "Is that a yes?" It should never be assumed
that some furtive motion is equivalent to consent. Particularly careful'
attention should be paid to instances where a recipient initially refuses
to consent, requests a justification for the search, or asks whether the
investigator has a search warrant. Although not required and sometimes
counterproductive, advising the recipients of their Miranda rights or
their right to refuse consent to a search are clear indicators of
voluntariness.
An investigator should never claim the right to enter unless he pos-
sesses a valid search warrant. Using threats or force is always unaccept-
able and almost assuredly unconstitutional." 3 Although much leeway
exists in light of Illinois v. Rodriguez,"4 third party consent should be
avoided at all costs. Legally definitive consent can only be received from
the welfare recipient. Investigators may generally assume that a recipient
may consent to an inspection of his dependent child's living quarters;
however, the scope of consent must at all times be reasonable. If any
uncertainty exists as to whether a particular room or item may be in-
spected, express consent should be requested. As a general rule, indepen-
dent consent should be obtained to search for items not in plain view.
C. Administrative Searches
Searches by public assistance investigators might also fit within one of
two legal niches that heretofore have gone untested in the welfare con-
413. See supra note 322.
414. 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (holding third party consent valid when premised on ap-
parent common authority).
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text. First, investigators could conduct warrantless administrative search-
es pursuant to the Supreme Court's Colonnade-Biswell doctrine.415 Sec-
ond, investigators could apply for and execute administrative search
warrants--instruments that require less than criminal probable cause to
issue."' As discussed below, the former option is fatally flawed by its
required nexus to commercial operations. The latter alternative, however,
offers a promising solution to the conflict between public concern over
welfare and individual constitutional rights.
1. Warrantless Administrative Searches
Beginning with Colonnade Corp. v. United States417 and Biswell v.
United States,"' the Supreme Court opined that warrantless searches
of certain "closely regulated" businesses would not necessarily violate
the Fourth Amendment." Industries governed by pervasive regulations,
the Court held, had reduced expectations of privacy in their buildings, ef-
fects, and documents.4' A businessman submerged in federal, state,
and local regulation simply "cannot help but be aware that his property
will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purpos-
es."421 The Colonnade-Biswell doctrine, therefore, "is essentially defined
415. Through what has become known as the Colonnade-Biswell doctrine, the Court
has recognized that the Fourth Amendment affords less protection to proprietors of
* "closely regulated" industries. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700-01 (1987) (citing
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72 (1970)).
416. See infra Part III.C.
417. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
418. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
419. Burger, 482 U.S. at 701-02; see also People v. Doss, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590, 598
(Ct. App. 1992); Los Angeles Chem. Co. v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 647, 655
(Ct. App. 1990); People v. Paulson, 265 Cal. Rptr. 579, 581 (Ct. App. 1990).
420. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-600 (1981); Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316;
Pinney v. Phillips, 281 Cal. Rptr. 904, 911, 912-13 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Kim v.
Dolch, 219 Cal. Rptr. 248, 250 (Ct. App. 1985).
421. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600; see also People v. Harbor Hut Restaurant, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 7, 8-9 (Ct App. 1983).
The central precept to be found in Colonnade, Biswell, and Donovan is that,
in undertaking to engage in a highly regulated and licensed enterprise, the
entrepreneur thereby consents to the array of regulations associated with the
trade; that is, its burden as well as its benefits. The businessman engaged in
such a trade cannot but reasonably anticipate that his establishment is sub-
ject to periodic inspections undertaken to further the regulatory objective.
Id.
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by 'the pervasiveness and regularity of the federal regulation' and the
effect of such regulation upon an owner's expectation of privacy." '
Moreover, "a long tradition of close government supervision" emphasizes
the ubiquity of the regulatory scheme and the limited solitude anticipated
by the industry.4' Because entrepreneurs in closely regulated industries
maintain lesser expectations of privacy in their businesses, the warrant
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment have dimin-
ished application.4" A warrantless search of these commercial premis-
es, therefore, can be "reasonable" and constitutionally valid. 2
The Supreme Court has established a three-part test for assessing the
validity of a warrantless search scheme pursuant to the Colonnade-
Biswell doctrine. First, there must be a substantial government interest
served by the warrantless investigations.42 Second, the warrantless
searches must be necessary to further the regulatory strategy.427 Third,
the investigatory scheme must provide "a constitutionally adequate sub-
stitute for a warrant" through its certainty and regularity of applica-
tion."2 This final prong essentially requires "narrow tailoring" of the in-
spection provisions to ensure minimal intrusion upon Fourth Amendment
rights.4" The Court has approved warrantless search schemes for Ii-
422. Burger, 482 U.S. at 701 (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600).
423. "[T]he duration of a particular regulatory scheme will often be an important
factor in determining whether it is sufficiently pervasive to make the imposition of a
warrant requirement unnecessary." Donovan, 452 U.S. at 606.
424. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 702; Donovan, 452 U.S. at 602; United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
315-16 (1977); see also Pinney v. Phillips, 281 Cal. Rptr. 904, 911-12 (Ct. App. 1991);
Los Angeles Chem. Co. v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 647, 655-56 (Ct. App. 1990);
People v. Paulson, 265 Cal. Rptr. 579, 581-82 (Ct. App. 1990); Kim v. Dolch, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 248, 251 (Ct. App. 1985).
427. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702; Donovan, 452 U.S. at 601, 602-03; Biswell, 406 U.S. at
316; see also Pinney, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 911-12; Los Angeles Chem. Co., 276 Cal. Rptr.
at 655-56; Paulson, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82; Kim, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
428. Burger, 482 U.S. at 703; see also Pinney, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 911-12; Los Angeles
Chem. Co., 276 Cal. Rptr. at 655-56; Paulson, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82; Kim, 219 Cal.
Rptr. at 252.
In other words, the regulatory statute must perform the two basic functions
of a warrant: It must advise the owner of the commercial premises that the
search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope,
and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers.
Burger, 482 U.S. at 703.
This is accomplished by. comprehensive regulations that place the businessman
on notice that his property may be subject to inspection and by careful limitations
on the time, place, and scope of any warrantless search. Id.
429. Kim, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
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censed firearm dealers,' underground and surface mines,431 and auto-
mobile junkyards.' Likewise, California courts have upheld warrant-
less inspection provisions for massage parlors,'2 liquor licensees,'
pharmacies,' optometrists,4  wholesale fish dealers, 7 vending ma-
chine licensees,' and nursing home licensees.'
Public assistance in America can be described as a massive industry.
Although the "stock holders" are ill-defined and a "mission statement" is
conspicuously absent, the pervasive regulatory scheme" and the sheer
numbers" involved are indicative of the industrial nature of the Ameri-
can welfare system. The government undoubtedly has a substantial inter-
est in curbing the tide of public assistance fraud. The unmitigated
fleecing of taxpayer largesse makes the detection and prevention of wel-
fare fraud a compelling concern for all levels of government. Moreover,
warrantless inspections of welfare recipients' homes are a necessary
component of any fraud detection scheme because it would be nearly
impossible to verify the absence of a parent or the presence of a depen-
dent child without home visits." "[G]overnment has a significant need
to routinely inspect for violations of public health and safety standards
for private property," reasoned one California appellate court, "[and]
such inspections involve 'a relatively limited invasion of... privacy.'"'
A keen legislator could draft a warrantless search scheme providing both
certainty and regularity in its application.
There are, however, obvious problems with applying the Colonnade-
Biswell doctrine to the homes of welfare recipients. Although the Ameri-
can welfare system can be loosely described as an "industry," individual
welfare recipients are neither businesses nor commercial entities. And
430. BisweU, 406 U.S. at 311.
431. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 594.
432. Burger, 482 U.S. at 691.
433. Kim, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
434. People v. Castillo, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 698 (Ct. App. 1992); People v. Paulson,
265 Cal. Rptr. 579, 583-84 (Ct. App. 1985).
435. People v. Doss, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590, 598 (Ct. App. 1992).
436. Miller v. Obledo, 145 Cal. Rptr. 140, 143 (Ct App. 1978).
437. People v. Harbor Hut Restaurant, 196 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10 (Ct. App. 1983).
438. Cowing v. City of Torrance, 131 Cal. Rptr. 830, 834 (Ct. App. 1976).
439. People v. Firstenberg, 155 Cal. Rptr. 80, 85-86 (Ct. App. 1979).
440. See CAl. WELF. & INST. CODE, §§ 10000-18995 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997).
441. See supra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
442. See supra Part lI.E.
443. People v. Lepeilbet, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371, 374 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-37 (1967)).
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even though their eligibility and concomitant payments are pervasively
regulated, they are human beings with no necessary connection to an
industrial complex. But more importantly, the Supreme Court and lower
courts have emphasized "the sanctity accorded an individual's home."'8
The underpinnings of this conviction are both historical and pragmatic: A
man's home is his castle, and only with grievous solicitude and upon
convincing rationales should government interfere with the privacy of his
abode. The warrant and probable cause requirements, therefore,
"safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary inva-
sions by governmental officials.""
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is... a grave concern, not
only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable secu-
rity and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by
a policeman or government enforcement agent"0
In contrast, commercial enterprises possess a lesser expectation of priva-
cy than an individual's home."7 The Supreme Court has articulated that
"business premises may... reasonably be inspected in many more situa-
tions than private homes.""' A broad definition of "reasonableness" un-
der the Fourth Amendment can countenance warrantless searches of
particular industries based on detailed statutory provisions and pervasive
regulations. But to extend that principle to private residences would
stretch the constitutional guarantee beyond its breaking point. The Col-
onnade-BisweU doctrine, therefore, is simply inapplicable in the welfare
context.
2. Administrative Search Warrants
"[N]o Warrants shall issue," proclaims the Fourth Amendment, "but
upon probable cause."' Probable cause is the general standard by
which the reasonableness, and hence, the constitutionality of a given
warrant, is judged.4"° As its name implies, probable cause deals with
probabilities-the likelihood that a certain fact will be found true."
444. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981).
445. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528.
446. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
447. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 599 ("The greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspec-
tions of commercial property reflects the fact that the expectation of privacy that the
owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the
sanctity accorded an individual's home."); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700
(1987) ("An expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different
from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home.").
448. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
449. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
450. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535.
451. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) ("'The substance of all the
1284
[Vol. 24: 1235, 19971 Wefare Fraud
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The appropriate considerations "are not technical; they are the factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act" 412 Probable cause is a "fluid
concept" which accommodates the factual and legal scenario at hand.45
Although it cannot be "reduced to a neat set of legal rules,"41 probable
cause in the criminal context can be roughly defined as "a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt."41 "Probable cause exists where 'the facts
and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has
been or is being committed."4M The facts and circumstances supporting
an administrative inspection, however, rarely suffice as criminal probable
cause.'s In the welfare context, allegations of fraud would seldom dem-
onstrate specific criminal activity. M Rather, fraud claims stem from
otherwise innocuous facts (e.g., the father living in the home) which in
and of themselves are not criminal. Moreover, direct corroboration is
often impossible to obtain. Anonymous phone tips of welfare fraud uni-
formly lack indices of "veracity," "reliability," or "basis for knowl-
edge." 'e Neighbors and acquaintances rarely provide evidence against
the recipient, fearing reprisal or exposure of their own fraud. And "prob-
able cause in the welfare context," according to the Court, "requires
more than the mere need of the caseworker to see the child in the home
and to have assurance that the child is there and is receiving the benefit
definitions' of probable cause 'is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt'") (citation
omitted).
452. Id.
453. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) ("[PJrobable cause is a fluid con-
cept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."); see also Brinegar,
338 U.S. at 175 ("The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be
proved.").
454. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232.
455. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175.
456. Id. at 175-76 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)) (alter-
ations in original).
457. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967) (noting the unique
attributes justifying area building inspections, including the passage of time, the na-
ture of the building, or the condition of the entire area).
458. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323 (1971).
459. Cf. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 (addressing the veracity, reliability, and basis for
knowledge of the author of an anonymous letter).
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of the aid that has been authorized for it."4" These inherent obstacles
to welfare fraud investigation "highlight[] the unworkability of attempting
to apply traditional standards of criminal probable cause to such
searches."'
Beginning in 1959, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
administrative inspections are a breed apart from criminal searches."'
"Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts that
would justify an inference of 'probable cause' to make an inspection are
clearly different from those that would justify such an inference where a
criminal investigation has been undertaken."' Probable cause, the
Court has held, is "a flexible standard of reasonableness" which can
conform to the needs and rights implicated by a particular search.'
Administrative searches are generally not intended to gather evidence of
criminal activity.' Inspection warrants serving administrative purposes,
therefore, need not be supported by criminal probable cause.4 " Rather,
such warrants can issue on a lesser quantum of proof than required for
criminal investigations. 7 Administrative probable cause can be estab-
lished by two methods. First, "specific evidence of an existing violation"
can justify the issuance of an administrative warrant.' "'[T]here must
be some plausible basis for believing that a violation is likely to be
found,'"' opined one California appellate court. "'The facts offered
must be sufficient to warrant further investigation.'"47 ' Second, adminis-
trative probable cause can be satisfied by "reasonable legislative or ad-
ministrative standards for conducting an... inspection [of] a particular
dwelling."47" ' Such standards could be based on, among other things,
"the passage of time."
472
460. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 324.
461. Salwasser Mfg. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd., 262 Cal. Rptr.
836, 841 (Ct. App. 1989).
462. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372-73 (1959).
463. Id. at 383 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
464. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 545 (1967).
465. People v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 238 Cal. Rptr. 761, 766 (App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1987) (citing See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967)).
466. Marshall v. Barlow's, 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978); Todd Shipyards Corp., 238 Cal.
Rptr. at 766.
467. County of Contra Costa v. Humore, Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 647, 653 (Ct. App.
1996) (finding sufficient evidence to support reasonable suspicion of ongoing viola-
tions to justify the issuance of an 'inspection permit).
468. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320.
469. Salwasser Mfg. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd, 262 Cal. Rptr.
836, 840 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., 647 F.2d 96, 102 (10th
Cir. 1981)).
470. Id. (quoting Marshall, 647 F.2d at 102).
471. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
472. Id.
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The California legislature has codified the administrative probable
cause standard and established procedures for the issuance of adminis-
trative inspection warrants. 4' The search must be pursuant to state or
local legislative mandates "relating to building, fire, safety, plumbing,
electrical, health, labor, or zoning.""' The warrant must be supported
by an affidavit demonstrating "cause,"475 "particularly describing" the
place to be searched and the purpose of the inspection.4 7 6 In addition,
the affidavit must aver that consent to inspect was requested and denied,
or give sufficient reasons why consent was not first sought.4" The issu-
ing judge may request testimony from the warrant applicant and other
witnesses to confirm the existence of cause to search.478 The warrant is
only valid for fourteen days after issuance,4" and may only be executed
between the hours of 8:00 am. and 6:00 p.m. in the presence of the
residence's owner or occupant.4 If consent to search had previously
been sought and refused, twenty-four hours notice must be given prior to
the execution of the warrant."' The statute also expressly prohibits the
use of force to enter the residence or conduct the search.'
Judicial opinions have upheld administrative search warrants in a vari-
ety of settings: occupational health and safety inspections of manufactur-
ing plants,' hazardous waste inspections of shipyards,' and build-
473. CAL. CirV. PROC. CODE § 1822.50-1822.59 (West 1994); see also People v.
Lepeilbet, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371, 372 (Ct. App. 1992); People v. Tillery, 260 Cal. Rptr.
320, 322-23 (Ct. App. 1989); Gleaves v. Waters, 220 Cal. Rptr. 621, 623-25 (Ct. App.
1985); City & County of San Francisco v. Municipal Court, 213 Cal. Rptr. 477, 481-82
(Ct. App. 1985); People v. Firstenberg, 155 Cal. Rptr. 80, 87 (Ct. App. 1979).
474. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1822.50.
475. Id. § 1822.51.
Cause shall be deemed to exist if either reasonable legislative or administra-
tive standards for conducting a routine or area inspection are satisfied with
respect to the particular place, dwelling, structure, premises, or vehicle, or
there is reason to believe that a condition of nonconformity exists with re-
spect to the particular place, dwelling, structure, premises, or vehicle.
Id. § 1822.52.
476. Id § 1822.51.
477. Id.
478. Id. § 1822.53.
479. Id. § 1822.55.
480. Id. § 1822.56.
481. Id.
482. Id. A person "who willfully refuses to permit an inspection," however, "is guilty
of a misdemeanor." Id. § 1822.57. Criminal liability, therefore, is intended to serve as
a substitute for official force.
483. Salwasser Mfg. Co. v. Occupational Health & Safety Appeals Bd., 262 Cal. Rptr.
1287
ing, zoning, and health and safety inspections of residences.' In the
opinion of this author, administrative inspection warrants would also be
appropriate in the welfare context. As noted by the Wyman Court, the
main focus of public assistance is the health and welfare of the depen-
dent child.' Nutrition, hygiene, and a healthy living environment are
the laudable goals of welfare. Administrative warrants to search the
homes of welfare recipients further the "health" and "safety" of a signifi-
cant portion of the citizenry and therefore would satisfy the statutory
requirements. 7 While criminal probable cause would almost certainly
be wanting, administrative probable cause could be demonstrated in
many welfare cases. For example, an anonymous call that a dependent
child does not live at the residence, coupled with an adult-only building
restriction in the complex, would likely suffice for probable cause.
The details of a welfare administrative warrant scheme would have to
be based on trial and error and the fallible interplay between judiciad
opinion and executive action. The first step, however, is the enactment
of enabling legislation by state or local officials. Until then, the adminis-
trative warrant in the welfare context remains only a theoretical possibil-
ity.
IV. A MODEST RECOMMENDATION: A TIERED APPROACH
TO WELFARE SEARCHES
Public assistance administrators have a multitude of alternatives in the
investigation of welfare eligibility and fraud. This author, however, would
suggest one of two models for conducting inspections of welfare
recipients' homes. First, consent walk-throughs could serve as the sole
method of investigation. As argued above, such schemes are wholly con-
sistent with the Constitution. Moreover, they are generally effective in
meeting the goals of welfare investigations.
Second, a tiered approach to welfare searches could be adopted. Each
of the aforementioned investigatory rubrics would serve an important
purpose in this multi-method scheme.
836, 842 (Ct. App. 1989).
484. People v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 238 Cal. Rptr. 761, 767 (App. Dep't Super. CL.
1987).
485. County of Contra Costa v. Humore, Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 647, 653-54 (Ct. App.
1996); People v. Lepeilbet, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37"1, 373-74 (Ct. App. 1992); People v.
Tillery, 260 Cal. Rptr. 320, 323 (Ct App. 1989); City & County of San Francisco v.
Municipal Court, 213 Cal. Rptr. 477, 482 (Ct. App. 1985).
486. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971).
487. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1822.50 ("any inspection required or authorized by state
or local law or regulation relating to building, fire, safety, plumbing, electrical, health,
labor, or zoning").
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A. Wyman "Home Visits."
Early fraud' investigators would utilize home visits to confirm a
recipient's eligibility for welfare benefits. Consistent with Wyman and
Whitburn, sufficient notice should be given to the recipients, and time
constraints should be placed on when a home visit can occur. If consent
to conduct a home visit is refused, welfare benefits can be denied or
terminated. This consequence, however, must stem from an inability to
verify eligibility for welfare; it should not result from a recipient's refusal
to permit a home visit.
B. Consent "Walk-Throughs."
Both early fraud and full field' investigators would request volun-
tary consent to search the recipient's residence where welfare fraud is
suspected. The consent, of course, must be voluntary. And as previously
argued, investigators should avoid legal "gray areas" by receiving un-
equivocal express consent to search from the welfare recipient. More-
over, investigators must always be mindful of the scope of consent, er-
ring on the side of independent permission.
C. Administrative Inspection Warrants.
Either early fraud or full field investigators could utilize an administra-
tive search warrant procedure. Such a warrant should be sought when
eligibility for welfare is in question, either from insufficient information
or suspected fraud. The statutory requirements, however, must be met.
The application for an inspection warrant must generally follow a re-
buffed request to search, and the warrant can only be executed in the
presence of the recipient between the hours of 8:00 am. and 6:00 p.m. As
noted above, enabling legislation by local or state officials for this pro-
posed "welfare warrant" has yet to be considered.
D. Criminal Search Warrants.
And finally, welfare investigators should seek a standard search war-
rant where criminal probable cause is apparent. Where sufficient evi-
dence can be produced to support "a reasonable ground for belief of
488. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
489. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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guilt"490 of welfare fraud, the often tedious search warrant process
should be heeded. Although such circumstances will rarely surface in the
welfare fraud context, criminal search warrants are always the preferable
method of investigation.
This tiered method could meet the often competing goals of public
assistance administrators: maximizing the detection and prevention of
welfare fraud, while minimizing the intrusion into the lives of welfare re-
cipients and staying within the bounds of the Constitution. Of course,
this proffered approach is only a suggestion. The intelligentsia of social
welfare are likely to have other, superior recommendations. But be as-
sured that welfare fraud is endangering the continued viability of the
American "safety net." There are many options within the realm of possi-
bility; the status quo, however, is not among them.
490. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
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